1 HAZID Session Report

This document describes the findings of the Hazard Identification (HAZID) study conducted in support of the Quantitative Risk Assessment for the LNG Terminal.

A HAZID workshop was conducted on the design of the LNG Terminal between 26^th and 28^th October 2004.

As part of the current EIA process and in cognisance of further developments in the design of the LNG Terminal, an additional HAZID workshop was held on 19^th and 20^th October 2005, to update the earlier study.

A layout review workshop was held on 21^st October 2005. The recommendations made during the workshop are reflected in the layout drawings used for the EIA studies.

1.1 Objectives & Scope

The objective of the HAZID study was to identify hazards posed by the siting of the LNG Terminal in Hong Kong SAR, with the main aim of identifying major hazards.

The HAZID study was based on the preliminary layout drawings, design basis and design/construction philosophies for the facilities. The HAZID study covered mainly the operational phase of the project.

The study assessed potential hazards associated with, amongst others, the following areas:

· LNG Terminal

- Natural Hazards

- External Hazards

- Material Hazards

- Loss of Utilities

- Layout Hazards

· Plant Systems

- Unloading Operation

- Transfer Pipeline from Jetty to Tank

- LNG Storage Tanks

- LP LNG System – Tank Pumpout

- Compressors – BOG, Ship, Pipeline

- HP LNG System

- ORV/SCR Vaporisers

- Fuel Gas, Gas Heating, Gas Metering

- Vent & Drain System

- Utilities & Auxiliary Systems

· Construction Phase

- Blasting Operations During Initial Construction

- Third LNG Tank Construction – Expansion

- Process System Construction - Expansion

1.2 Methodology

1.2.1 Documents Reviewed

The following documentation was available for the HAZID studies:

· PFDs, Process description;

· Location and layout of facilities, plot plans.

1.2.2 HAZID Methodology

The hazards posed by the facility were identified based on team’s experience, past accidents, lessons learnt and checklists. The hazard identification was carried out at a high level, i.e. at the plant and unit level.

In order to ensure that a systematic approach is adopted, the facility was divided into a number of ‘subsystems’ based on the layout and the process; the guidewords from the checklist (Table 1.1) was then applied to each subsystem as relevant. Some of the guidewords such as natural hazards and external hazards however, were applied at the plant level only.

A “brainstorming” session was held involving a team of specialists from various disciplines. The objective of this brainstorming session was to identify all the hazards, particularly those specific to the plant/project under consideration.

The study team considered each area in turn and any hazards that apply to it. The hazards discussed included hazardous materials stored in these areas.

The study included the assessment of:

· Hazards;

· Potential Consequences;

· Safeguards; and

· Proposed Prevention, Control and Mitigation Factors.

The Study Team discussed recommendations for risk reduction and/or further study as appropriate.

HAZID worksheets were used to record the hazards, the consequences, safeguards and additional mitigation measures.

The study output will also serve as a basis for identification of scenarios for the QRA study.

Table 1.1 Checklist for Hazard Identification

General

Material hazards

Toxic, flammable, explosion, oxidising, spontaneously flammable, carcinogenic

Plant Level

Natural hazards
Earthquake
Tidal waves
Storm/flooding
High wind
Subsidence/movement
Extreme weather
Sand storm

External hazards
Aircraft crash
Arson/sabotage
Neighbouring plants/facilities
HV cables
3^rd party interference

Layout hazards
Separation
Approach
Escape

Unit Level

Process hazards
(process areas, storage areas, utility areas & unloading areas)
Loss of containment
Inventory
Fire
Explosion
Missiles
Toxicity
Reaction exotherm
Interface with other plants : isolation, control
Loss of utility/communications

Transport hazards
Road vehicles on site
Helicopter

Shipping Hazards
Collision
Grounding
Striking
Fire/explosion
Foundering

1.3 HAZID Sessions and layout Review Workshop

1.3.1 Study Period

The HAZID study was conducted from 19^th to 20^th October 2005. A layout review workshop was held on 21^st October 2005. The HAZID sessions and layout review workshop were held in Foster Wheeler’s office in Houston, USA.

1.3.2 HAZID Study Team

The HAZID team comprised a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the project and having adequate experience of design, operations, and safety and loss prevention.

Representatives from CLP Power, ExxonMobil, ARUP and Foster Wheeler participated in the HAZID sessions. Venkatesh S of ERM chaired the HAZID sessions.

The details (names, discipline and company) of the HAZID team members who attended each HAZID session are presented in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 List of Participants for the HAZID Study during the EIA Studies

Name	Company	Discipline	19th Oct 2005	20th Oct 2005
Jim Power	CLP	Technical Advisor	Ö	Ö
Siu Fung Wong	CLP	Technical Associate	Ö	Ö
Francis Chau	CLP	Technical Services	Ö	Ö
Peter Thompson	Arup	Civil Design	Ö	Ö
Cathy Duke	EM	Gas Engineering	Ö	Ö
Cheryl Grounds	EMDC	Safety and Risk	Ö	Ö
Charles Hughes	EMDC	Marine and Civil	Ö	Ö
Winston Shu	EMDC	Senior Technical Advisor, Gas Engineering	Ö	Ö
Steven Wu	EMDC	Civil and Structure	Ö	Ö
Gary Spargo	EMDC	Construction Advisor	Ö	Ö
William Duncan	EMDC	Captain	Ö	Ö
Patrick Wong	EMDC	Geotechnical	Ö	Ö
Efren P Rocha	EMPC	Operations Advisor	Ö	Ö
Sam Hwong	Foster Wheeler	Project Manager	Ö	Ö
Zupeng Huang	Foster Wheeler	LNG Process	Ö	Ö
C C Yang	Foster Wheeler	Director, LNG Technology	Ö	Ö
David Labay	Foster Wheeler	Piping Engineer	Ö	Ö
Risk Speicher	Foster Wheeler	Construction	Ö	Ö
Justo Benitez	Foster Wheeler	Electrical Engineering	Ö	Ö
K B Tammana	Foster Wheeler	Instrumentation	Ö	Ö
Ted Ban	Foster Wheeler	Civil	Ö	Ö
Larry Watrous	Mustang	Fire Protection	Ö	Ö
Robin Kennish	ERM	EIA Permitting	Ö	Ö
Venkatesh S	ERM	HAZID Facilitator/ QRA	Ö	Ö

1.3.3 HAZID Study Worksheets

The session proceedings were recorded using PHA-Pro 6 software. The records were projected on a screen for comments and agreement by the team members during the sessions.

The completed HAZID worksheets are attached in the Appendix.

1.4 Recommendations

Table 1.3 lists the actions identified during the HAZID sessions. These actions will be incorporated in the detailed design.

Table 1.3 Actions for Each Area Considered

Action No.	Hazards	Action
1	Natural Hazards - Typhoon - high wind & storm waves	Design criteria for jetty design at Castle Peak station may be referred in relation to design against wave height
2	Natural Hazards - Lightning	Consider the impact of power dips due to lightening in equipment specification for motor drives
3	Natural Hazards - Hill fire	Liaise with AFCD and FSD to provide a fire barrier at the boundary fence to prevent fire propagation
4	Natural Hazards - Subsidence	Consider past experience in Hong Kong reclamation areas on subsidence and incorporate applicable action in to the design of this facility
5	Natural Hazards - Sea water - seasonal variation in salinity	Consider seawater salinity variation in the design of loading arm and jetty design as well as the dredging requirement at the berth to accommodate the carrier
6	External Hazards - Aircraft crash	Include in the QRA study for Soko, the likelihood of aircraft crash
7	External Hazards - Helicopter crash	Consider establishing no fly zone over the terminal area or impact of helicopter flight path on the facility to be considered
8	Loss of Utilities - Loss of Power supply	Reliability of power supply to the LNG terminal to be studied during pre-FEED. Options may include direct supply from station, redundant supply sources
9	Loss of Utilities - Loss of sea water supply	Design of sea water intake to consider potential for blockage due to debris including fishing nets etc to ensure reliability of sea water supply
10	Loss of Utilities - Loss of fresh water supply	Fresh water supply to Soko to be reviewed during pre-FEED
11	ORV/SCV Vaporisers -Heavy metals in sea water	Potential impact on ORV due to mercury content in sea water to be (re)confirmed during design based on vendor data
12	External Hazards - Radio-isotopes	Review the regulatory requirements for storage and handling of radio-isotopes for welding/ inspection and make suitable provisions at the site
13	Transfer Pipeline from Jetty to Tank - Collision of drifting vessels or fishing vessels with trestle structure	Review the requirements for a safety zone around jetty.
14	LNG Storage Tanks - Loss of containment	Develop a write up documenting this scenario, i.e. the impact of overpressure inside the tank on the outer containment/ roof
15	LNG Storage Tanks - Hydrotesting of tanks	Consider the impact of seawater for hydrotesting on tank metallurgy
16	LP LNG System – Tank pumpout - inspection of pressure vessel	Investigate whether on-line inspection is feasible and meets regulatory requirements
17	ORV/SCV Vaporisers -Overpressure in vaporizer outlet piping	Review, during detailed design, overpressure safeguards for piping downstream of vaporiser
18	Vent & Drain System - Discharge of gas from vent stack	Analyze the pros and cons of a vent versus flare option to determine the appropriate path forward
19	Natural Hazards - Landslip - landslides	Detailed layout will consider pipe rack routing from/to tanks to not be at the base of the rock cut
20	Natural Hazards - Tsunami - associated with subsea earthquake	Consider developing procedures for LNG carrier departure following Tsunami warning

Appendix

HAZID Worksheets

HAZID Worksheet

System: 1. LNG Terminal Overview

Subsystem: 1. Natural hazards

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Typhoon - high wind & storm waves	1. High wind	1. Possible impact on structures due to high wind	1. Design basis for the facility - HK Code of Practice for Wind Effects 2004 by BD (3 sec gust for 50 yr return period) for land buildings/ structures. Port Work Design Manual will be followed for marine structures (3 sec gust for 50 yr return period). Based on the design factors specific to the HK Code, this may be considered equivalent to 1 in 100 year return period of other international codes	1. Design criteria for jetty design at Castle Peak station may be referred in relation to design against wave height
	2. Storm waves	2. Impact on berthing and unloading operation	2. Operating practice with regard to berthing & unloading in adverse conditions
		3. Possible damage to structures/ facilities due to storm wave and associated flooding	3. Site elevation to be based on wave height for 1 in 100 year return period. Sea wall will be constructed along the shoreline. Elevation at South Soko locations exposed to storm waves (east side) will be +10m PD.
2. Lightning	1. Lightning	1. Possible ignition of discharges from vent stack/ PSVs on tank roof	1. Fire snuffing system for PSVs on tank top and vent stack	2. Consider the impact of power dips due to lightening in equipment specification for motor drives
		2. Possible ignition of discharges to vent at ship end	2. Radiation effects from ignited vent stack considered in vent stack design (i.e. height and proximity to other features)
		3. Possible impact on instrumentation and control due to power surge	3. Plant instrumentation system designed for fail safe condition
		4. Power dips leading to possible interruption in plant	4. Procedure to shut down cargo transfer operations
3. Earthquake	1. Earthquake	1. Possible damage to facility; potential leaks due to loss of containment	1. Tank designed as per code EN1473 requirement
			2. Other process structures - piping & jetty designed as per EN1473
			3. Occupied buildings designed to Hong Kong building codes (1in 2475 return period for MCE (Maximum Credible Earthquake) which is similar to IBC 2003
4. Heavy rainfall - flooding	1. Heavy rainfall	1. Possible damage to facilities due to flooding	1. Stormwater drainage system designed to DSD Manual for 1 in 50 year storm on the basis that this is a urban branch drainage system with diameters not exceeding 1.8m.
5. Fog - poor visibility	1. Fog	1. No significant impact during unloading or facility operation	1. Collision hazards while the vessel is berthed considered in marine traffic impact study
		2. Possible collision of other craft with the LNG vessel while berthed
6. Landslip - landslides	1. Landslides from man-made slopes or natural terrain due to slope instability or earthquake	1. Possible damage to tanks, piping, and facility including control room/ admin buildings	1. Geotechnical studies during design phase and slope design and maintenance	19. Detailed layout will consider pipe rack routing from/to tanks to not be at the base of the rock cut.
			2. Geotechnical studies during design phase and slope stability measures to consider impact of earthquakes of 1 in 10,000 year return period
7. Landslip - boulderfall	1. Boulderfall	1. Possible damage to tanks, piping, and facility including control room/ admin buildings	1. Geotechnical studies during design phase and boulder removal/ stabilisation measures. See recommendation 19
8. Hill fire	1. Hill fire within the boundary fence	1. Potential source of ignition	1. Vegetation management inside the fence	3. Liaise with AFCD and FSD to provide a fire barrier at the boundary fence to prevent fire propagation
	2. Hill fire outside the boundary fence - in the vicinity of the fence	2. Potential fire spread to vegetation inside the fence & possible impact on facility
9. Subsidence	1. Subsidence in reclamation	1. Misalignment and damage to tank/ piping structures (at Soko site, part of the process areas and two tanks could be on rock while future 3rd tank and part of the process areas could be on reclaimed land)	1. 3rd tank will be built some years after reclamation, providing time for monitoring	4. Consider past experience in Hong Kong reclamation areas on subsidence and incorporate applicable action in to the design of this facility
			2. Geotechnical studies to determine performance of sub-soil and incorporation in design
			3. If required, 3rd future tank can be supported on piles
10. Tsunami - associated with subsea earthquake	1. Tidal waves higher than predicted	1. Possible damage to structures/ facilities due to high wave and associated flooding	1. LNG ship cargo transfer operations would be ceased following Tsunami warning.	20. Consider developing procedures for LNG carrier departure following Tsunami warning
			2. Stormwater drainage system
			3. Black Point site does not face the open seas & hence less susceptible, as compared to Sokos
			4. Analysis has shown that expected Tsunami height at terminal locations would be approximately equal to the historical extreme sea level (5.5m PD) (based on 8.5 Richter scale earthquake in the Philippines). S. Soko Terminal elevation exposed to Tsunami proposed at +10m PD.
11. Sea water -seasonal variation in salinity	1. Salinity varies from 2000 to 45,000ppm depending on Pearl River water discharge	1. Sea water density will vary which could affect the LNG carrier draft and accordingly the loading arm movement envelope		5. Consider seawater salinity variation in the design of loading arm and jetty design as well as the dredging requirement at the berth to accommodate the carrier
		2. Impact on electrochlorination plant as hypochlorite will not be generated at low salinity levels. This could impact hypo injection in sea water intake. No significant consequence
12. Sea water - seasonal variation in suspended solids	1. Suspended solids may vary from 40 to 800 mg/l	1. Increased siltation leading to increased seawater intake filter maintenance	1. ORV and intake filter system design specification will reflect suspended solids content
		2. Impact on ORV operation
13. Tidal currents	1. Tidal currents may impact the ability to safely berth	1. Possible impact on berthing of LNG carrier	1. Maximum current condition to be considered in design basis
			2. Berthing operations will not be undertaken in high current conditions (based on evaluation of tug capacity to handle berthing operations).

System: 1. LNG Terminal Overview

Subsystem: 2. External hazards

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Aircraft crash	1. During take-off / landing	1. Damage to the facility and fire	1. Black Point site not in the flight path; site about 20km away from airport	6. Include in the QRA study for Sokos, the likelihood of aircraft crash
2. Helicopter crash	1. Helipad at BPPS and at the radar station	1. Damage to the facility and fire	1. Helipad at the radar station near BPPS used for specific purpose and not frequent (about once per week)	7. Consider establishing no fly zone over the terminal area or impact of helicopter flight path on the facility to be considered
	2. Helipad at Sokos (provided for site access by air- usage infrequent)	2. Same as 1
3. Fishing vessels in the vicinity		1. Fishing vessels may be present within the safety zone while the carrier is berthed; possible ignition source as well as collision hazards	1. Enforce safety zone
4. Drifting/ Passing vessels	1. Loss of power or collision between passing vessels	1. Possible damage to the jetty/ trestle and the carrier while berthed; loss of containment due to damage to piping	1. Tugboats in attendance while the carrier is berthed
			2. Isolation valves at the jetty and shore end
			3. Jetty and trestle designed for certain impact load as per standard practice
			4. Trestle sheltered by mooring dolphins and connecting structures
			5. Marine traffic impact study to consider collision of passing and drifting vessels with the jetty structure as well as carrier while berthed
			6. Navigation aids, lights, buoys and guard boats
5. Radar station	1. No issue other than helicopter activity considered above
6. Oil or chemical spills on the sea	1. Due to collision or sinking of passing vessels or due to incidents associated with oil barges serving BPPS	1. Contamination of seawater intake leading to shutdown of ORV operation	1. Intake at about 10m depth
		2. Possible ignition of spill affecting the jetty and trestle structure	2. Emergency response measures
7. Hikers in the vicinity		1. Impact on hikers in the event of any incident at the terminal	1. Impact considered in the risk study
			2. Property/security fence with some setback distance from the facility
8. Pleasure fishing in the vicinity	1. Same as fishing boats, considered above
9. Illegal immigrants or smugglers approaching the facility by fast boats or other means		1. Security concern/ trespass	1. Security plan for the facility
10. Fuel oil tank on fire or fuel oil tank rupture at BPPS	1. Fuel oil stored as emergency back up fuel for gas turbine	1. Facility is about 500m away and hence impact due to fire not likely
11. H2 fire/ explosion at BPPS	1. H2 stored at BPPS for generator cooling	1. Potential for projectiles causing damage to the facility	1. Trailer bay located in a concrete compound with ventilation, leak/fire detection
			2. No. of cylinders in a trailer limited to 12 or 26 and max 2 trailers
			3. Trailer house about 1km from LNG terminal
12. Projectiles from turbine accidents at BPPS	1. Mechanical failure of turbine or lube oil failure	1. Potential for projectiles causing damage to the facility	1. Periodic inspection of the turbine
			2. Turbine located in a housing and turbine housing is within a structure
			3. Full containment tank designed to withstand projectile impact
			4. Natural terrain acts as a barrier between the tanks and the BPPS site and the turbines are located greater than 500 m from the terminal
13. Gas leaks at BPPS	1. Leak in the open or in the gas turbine enclosure	1. Fire or explosion in the BPPS; impact on LNG terminal considered less likely due to the separation distance of more than 200m	1. Gas leak detection and shutdown system at BPPS
14. Boiler explosion	1. High pressure (100 bar) steam boiler	1. Potential for projectiles causing damage to the facility	1. Full containment tank designed to withstand projectile impact
			2. Natural terrain acts as a barrier between the tanks and the BPPS site
			3. Boiler controls/ inspection and maintenance
15. Pipeline leak from BPPS to CPPS	1. Pipe at about 38barg, 6km long and 600mm diameter	1. Possible impact on the access road to BPPS and LNG terminal site; impact on the LNG terminal is considered less likely due to the separation distance and the natural terrain barrier	1. Pipeline is buried with shutdown valve at either end
			2. Pipeline inspection and maintenance
16. Temporary ammonium nitrate emulsion storage near BPPS	1. Facility operated by 3rd party	1. Potential fire and explosion	1. Separation distance is at least 1 km and there is a hill located between the emulsion storage and the LNG terminal.
			2. Impact considered in QRA

System: 1. LNG Terminal Overview

Subsystem: 3. Material hazards

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. LNG	1. LNG handled as liquid at -162 deg C (at 0.1 to 6barg) and as gas at max of 101 barg (at about 5 to 15 deg C for South Soko and about 50 to 60 deg C for Black Point)	1. Potential for fire; potential overpressure upon ignition of vapour cloud in confined and congested environment	1. Design as per Codes with appropriate safety systems including detection, shutdown, area classification
		2. Potential for brittle failure where non-cryogenic material is exposed	2. Operating and safety procedures
		3. Personnel hazards on contact with cold liquid; asphyxiation hazards
2. Hypochlorite	1. Onsite generation likely using electrochlorination process. Used for disinfection of seawater intake	1. Concentration very low; personnel hazards; small amounts of hydrogen generated	1. Design provision to vent off H2 safely
3. Caustic solution	1. Caustic required for neutralising SCV water discharge	1. Personnel hazards	1. Operating and safety procedures
4. Nitrogen	1. Nitrogen may be generated onsite or purchased - used for loading arm operations, maintenance purging	1. Asphyxiation hazards, particularly in confined spaces	1. Operating and safety procedures
	2. N2 bottles for purging of vent stacks/ fire extinguishment
5. Pressurised air	1. Generated onsite for process and instrument requirements	1. Pressure system hazards	1. Design procedures
			2. Operating and safety procedures
6. Dry chemical powders	1. Used for fire fighting	1. Personnel hazards (inhalation) while handling	1. Operating and safety procedures
7. Diesel oil	1. For emergency power generation, fire water pumps and other maintenance equipment (cranes)	1. Potential fire hazards	1. Design safety and operating procedures
8. Glycol solution (about 35%)	1. Used as heating fluid for the fuel gas heater	1. Not a combustible fluid as it is a solution in water and concentration is low. Personnel handling hazards	1. Operating and safety procedures
9. Lubricants/ greases	1. For general machinery maintenance	1. Spill/ contamination	1. Curb area around user equipment including drip pans
10. Hydraulic oil	1. Hydraulic oil for loading arm movement - pressures of about 300psi	1. No significant safety issue. Spill hazard on the jetty platform and possibly on the sea (from connections)	1. Curb area in the jetty platform. Volume in connection piping insignificant
11. Methanol	1. Methanol for de-icing of flanges and valves (external application) - handled in containers	1. Flammable hazards. Personnel hazards in the event of spillage/ contact	1. Operating and safety procedures
			2. Storage in approved DG stores
12. Paints and Solvents	1. For painting use at site	1. Flammable hazards	1. Operating and safety procedures
			2. Storage in approved DG stores
13. Radio-isotopes	1. For maintenance operation - welding/ inspection	1. Radiation hazards to personnel but low level radiation	1. Procedures for handling and storage	12. Review the regulatory requirements for storage and handling of radio-isotopes for welding/ inspection and make suitable provisions at the site
14. Gas cylinders	1. Helium or other gas for GC calibration, lab analysis	1. Physical explosion hazards	1. Storage in approved DG stores
	2. CO2 cylinders for fire extinguishment
15. Laboratory Chemicals	1. For any lab analysis of samples	1. Flammable, toxic hazards to personnel handling chemicals	1. Operating and safety procedures
16. Chemicals for sewage treatment at Soko	1. Alums	1. Personnel hazards during handling	1. Operating and safety procedures

System: 1. LNG Terminal Overview

Subsystem: 4. Loss of Utilities

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Loss of Power supply	1. For Black Point site, power will be supplied externally	1. Terminal will shutdown in safe mode; gas export will stop leading to loss of supply to BPPS; boil-off gas may be vented to stack; unloading operation will likely stop; heat leak in piping and equipment leading to overpressure under blocked condition	1. Insulation and thermal/pressure relief	8. Reliability of power supply to the LNG terminal to be studied during pre-FEED. Options may include direct supply from station, redundant supply sources
	2. For Soko site, onsite generation may be required in addition to external supply		2. Emergency generator & UPS for critical users/systems including lighting, controls and other safety critical systems
2. Loss of Instrument air supply		1. System designed to go to safe shutdown mode	1. Redundant air compressors; air receiver; emergency power supply
3. Loss of Nitrogen supply	1. N2 required for unloading arm swivel joint operation when in use (and for draining and purging after unloading); continuous purging requirements for electrical junction boxes and potentially for vent stack purging	1. Potential impact on swivel joint operation. Delay in completion of unloading	1. Redundant N2 source (generation and small liquid storage/vaporizer)
		2. Potential moisture ingress or gas ingress into junction boxes	2. Operating procedures
4. Loss of sea water supply	1. Sea water used for ORV operation; power supply failure or debris in sea water intake or flooding of pump house may cause loss of sea water supply	1. Impact on ORV operation leading to partial loss of sendout gas	1. SCVs may be operating or on standby for partial supply of gas	9. Design of sea water intake to consider potential for blockage due to debris including fishing nets etc to ensure reliability of sea water supply
			2. Multiple sea water supply pumps & power source
5. Loss of fuel gas supply	1. Fuel gas supplied from LNG	1. For the Black Point site, it will affect SCV operation and reduce sendout gas supply (under peak supply condition)	1. Redundancy in fuel gas supply considered in design
		2. For Sokos site, it will affect onsite power generation and hence the sendout of the gas	2. External power supply for Soko
6. Loss of diesel supply	1. Diesel used for fire water pumps and emergency power generator	1. Impact on emergency response	1. On-site diesel storage
			2. Day tank storage associated with each user equipment
7. Loss of fresh water supply	1. Fresh water used for initial fill of SCVs; fire water jockey pump operation; personnel use; washing/ hose station etc	1. No significant consequence to the plant operations; potential personnel issue	1. On-site fresh water storage	10. Fresh water supply to Sokos to be reviewed during pre-FEED
			2. Water will be provided via pipeline. Either the existing line will be used or a new line will be installed. (South Sokos)

System: 1. LNG Terminal Overview
Subsystem: 5. Layout hazards
Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Layout Hazards	1. A layout review was carried out separately and actions from the review will be incorporated in the new layout	1. The layout will be reviewed based on QRA results & during pre-FEED phase

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 1. Unloading operation

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Loss of containment	1. Unloading arms - leakage from swivel joints	1. Leakage from swivel joints would be minor leakages	1. N2 purge and leak detection system
	2. Unloading arms - leakage from mechanical flange joints	2. Liquid spill or vapour release; potential fire; impact on structure due to cold liquid spill	2. Operator monitoring
	3. Unloading arms - disconnection under extreme weather condition	3. Impact of cold liquid spill leaking from the connection flange on the ship manifold area	3. Emergency shutdown of unloading operation
	4. Leak from piping and equipment at the jetty - drain vessel and/or knock-out drum		4. One of the liquid unloading arms can be used as vapour return arm during maintenance of vapour arm; periodic maintenance of arms/ swivel joints
			5. Gas detection and low temp. detection; fire detection; fire water monitors at the jetty at different elevation (remote operated)
			6. Loading arm platform designed to withstand cold liquid spill
			7. Arm position limit detection and activation of shutdown valves at jetty end
			8. Powered Emergency Release Coupler with valves at either end of coupling results in isolation of both ship end and jetty end
			9. Spill containment system at the jetty platform with high expansion foam
			10. Continuous water curtain during unloading localised at the ship manifold area
2. Spill/ Fire on the carrier while berthed	1. Spill from connections on the ship deck	1. Radiation effects on the jetty structure and facilities and personnel	1. Spill containment system & emergency shutdown system on the ship
			2. Fire protection system on the ship
			3. Fire protection system at the jetty
			4. Tugs with fire fighting capability
3. Manual Operations	1. Arm movement and coupling connection between the arm and ship manifold (done on the ship) thru hydraulic controls operated manually.	1. Impact of arm on the ship manifold due to operator error or due to ship movement. Possible damage to the arm connection coupler	1. Operator training
	2. Gangway positioning from the platform to the ship	2. Impact with the ship causing damage to the gangway	2. Hydraulic control is slow and controlled
			3. Weather condition check
			4. Cabling assisted connection to enable loading arm operation under adverse conditions if required
4. Personnel Hazard	1. Fall from gangway, jetty platform	1. Possible injury	1. Guard rails on platform and gangway
	2. Contact with cold surfaces - coupling connection on the ship (platform piping is insulated)		2. PPE (flotation devices)
			3. Controlled access to the platform/ gangway
			4. Controlled access to the arm coupling connection
	3. Ice falling off from the arm after disconnection
			5. PPE (hard hats) and controlled access
			6. Operating Procedures
5. Impact while berthing	1. Impact of LNG carrier on the jetty while berthing due to higher than operational approach speed limit	1. Damage to jetty structure; possible damage to piping	1. Tug assisted berthing with approach speed limits and indicators
			2. Fenders designed for specified impact load
			3. Mooring masters on the shore side to supervise the berthing
			4. Local HK Pilots onboard LNG carriers during berthing
6. Maintenance	1. Maintenance of arm - replacement of seals (about once every 5 years) - undertaken between unloading operations and will require scaffolding	1. General personnel hazards associated with maintenance activities, such as fall	1. Operating and safety procedures
	2. Replacement of arm (expected about once every 20 years) - this will require barge/ crane operation. Operation undertaken between unloading operations
7. Emergency Egress	1. Emergency on the ship or the jetty	1. Potential injury if unable to escape	1. Normal access to the jetty and secondary egress to the mooring dolphin
8. Others - jetty operator shelter	1. Weather shelter for operator presence during unloading operations	1. No significant issue

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 2. Transfer Pipeline from Jetty to Tank

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Leak in liquid transfer piping	1. Sudden closure of shutdown valve at shore end while unloading leading to surge or weld defect	1. LNG spill and potential fire, and potential exposure of marine traffic to liquid spill	1. Transfer piping on the trestle is welded with no flange connections
			2. Pressure and flow sensors on the transfer piping
			3. Surge analysis during design
			4. Provision of shore isolation valve with spill containment system
			5. Any thermal reliefs required will discharge to a closed system
			6. Activation of Emergency Shutdown System stops LNG carrier unloading pumps before closing isolation valves
2. Collision of drifting vessels or fishing vessels with trestle structure		1. Possible damage to the structure leading to potential damage to transfer piping	1. Buoys and navigation aids, lights	13. Review the requirements for a safety zone around jetty.
			2. Emergency shutdown valve in piping at jetty end and shore end
			3. Safety zone around jetty would be documented on navigational charts
3. Vehicle accidents on the roadway	1. Road access on the trestle for maintenance vehicle & personnel movement	1. Possible damage to transfer piping	1. Segregation of roadway and piping
		2. Potential for vehicles and passengers to fall off trestle into the sea	2. Speed limit and other controls on vehicle movement
			3. Access lighting will be provided
4. Loss of circulation while not unloading	1. In-tank pumps used for circulation; multiple pumps provided	1. Heat leak and potential pressure build-up over a period of time	1. Insulation on transfer piping
			2. Thermal relief valves on piping
			3. Transfer piping floating with the tank and hence pressure build-up not expected
5. Jetty security	1. 3rd party access from water	1. Access to jetty/ trestle equipment handling LNG	1. Cameras at jetty with surveillance in control room
			2. Routine security guard check
			3. Controlled access at shore end of trestle

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 3. LNG Storage Tanks

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Overfilling	1. Level indication failure	1. Overflow to the annular space leading to overpressure in tank	1. Multiple level indication and trip (2 oo3 voting )
2. Overpressure	1. LNG received from ship is at higher saturation pressure; loading rate higher than design; compressor trip	1. Potential damage to the tank	1. High pressure indication and trip of liquid inflow (2oo3 voting) isolates tank from fill lines and initiates ESD and shuts down ship's pumps
			2. Relief from tanks to vent stacks (thru PCV and relief valves); relief valves on tank to atmosphere, as per code requirement
3. Underpressure	1. Pressure control malfunction; barometric change of pressure; inflow of sub-cooled liquid	1. Potential damage to the tank	1. Low pressure trip of compressor & transfer pumps
			2. Make-up gas or N2
			3. Vacuum relief valves on tank as per code requirements
4. Rollover	1. De-stratification of different density liquid	1. Potential overpressure due to high vapour evolution rates	1. Operating procedures
			2. Instrumentation to detect stratification
			3. Top and bottom tank loading provisions
			4. Tank circulation
			5. Relief system sized for rollover condition
5. Failure of tank bottom heating	1. Loss of power; heating coil malfunction	1. Potential frost heave at the tank bottom leading to tank damage; impact over a period of time	1. Temp. measurement
			2. Replacement of heating element while in operation considered in design
			3. Turbine generators on site as back up power supply to the main supply from the grid (South Soko)
6. Dropped object	1. Dropped object inside tank (primarily in-tank pump during maintenance)	1. Possible damage to the tank bottom plate leading to leakage of inner tank into the outer tank	1. Fail safe lifting cables
			2. Maintenance procedures
			3. Low temp. detector in annular space to detect inner tank leak
7. Leaks on roof top	1. Flange joints on roof top	1. Cold liquid spill and potential ignition	1. Spill containment with gas and fire detection and fire protection system
8. Ignition of relief discharge	1. Due to lightning occurring while relief valve is in operation (less likely)	1. Radiation effects on tank and valves/piping on roof	1. Snuffing provision at the relief discharge
			2. Discharge piping elevation design will provide protection to piping on the roof
9. Accidental relief discharge	1. Damage due to maintenance in the vicinity	1. Potential vapour release to atmosphere	1. Relief valves are sized/provided as n+1.
10. Inner tank leak (9% Ni)	1. Material defect or thermal cycle stress	1. Possible overpressure	1. Liner provided on outside of inner shell 9% Ni plate at the bottom to contain design spill
			2. Low temp. detection at the annular space
			3. Overpressure protection thru relief valves
11. Loss of containment	1. Overpressure inside tank	1. Potential leak at roof to wall seam with vapour release from tank surface. No loss of either tank wall integrity envisioned.	1. Relief valves provided.	14. Develop a write up documenting this scenario, ie the impact of overpressure inside the tank on the outer containment/ roof.
		2. No feasible scenario envisioned for concurrent failure of both inner and outer walls	2. Tank designed to meet EN 1473
			3. Operating procedures and indications such as pressure
12. External fire	1. Fire in process area	1. Possible thermal radiation effects on tank	1. Concrete outer shell can withstand radiation effects
			2. Fire detection and emergency shutdown system
13. Maintenance issues	1. Normal maintenance involves only external visual inspection, settlement monitoring, and foundation heating system monitoring	1. No hazards envisioned	1. No corrosion issues envisioned due to cryogenic and non corrosive service
14. Tank start-up	1. Cool down operation	1. Localized stresses due to rapid cool down which could lead to potential inner tank failure	1. Controlled cooling rate, monitoring temperature drop across shell
	2. Purging of inner tank and annular space with nitrogen purge to remove air and moisture	2. Venting of nitrogen- LNG vapor mix to atmosphere to achieve required cool down	2. Start up plans and procedures
		3. Possible air pockets if purging operations not adequate	3. Monitoring of oxygen content leaving tank
			4. Procedure for purging annular space
15. Access and egress to/from rooftop	1. Emergency incident	1. Need to egress to a safe location	1. Two stairways provided from tank top
16. Hydrotesting of tanks	1. Disposal of test water	1. Potential environmental impact	1. Environmental impact studies will include consideration of tank commissioning issues	15. Consider the impact of seawater for hydrotesting on tank metallurgy
	2. Use of seawater for hydrotesting	2. Potential chloride induced stress corrosion of tank metallurgy (welds and heat effected zone)

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 4. LP LNG System - Tank pumpout

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Loss of containment	1. Leak from piping at recondenser and at HP pump suction	1. Potential leak and fires	1. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection systems; localized containment area
2. Inspection of pressure vessel	1. Inspection and testing of recondenser as per code requirement	1. Loss of ability to recondense BOG	1. Provision to compress part of the BOG directly to send out system which will meet a fraction of the BOG volume. The remaining BOG vapour will be vented to stack.	16. Investigate whether on-line inspection is feasible and meets regulatory requirements
			2. Recondenser provided with a bypass

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 5. BOG Compressors - BOG, Ship, Pipeline

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Leaks	1. Three compressors – boil-off gas, high pressure pipeline send out and vapors during unloading	1. Potential gas leak and fires	1. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection system
2. Dropped object during maintenance	1. Drop compressor parts on adjacent, operating compressor	1. Potential damage and loss of containment	1. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection system
			2. Lifting and maintenance procedures

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 6. HP LNG System

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Loss of containment	1. Leak from piping downstream of the HP pump (pressure approx. 100 bar); ; HP pump in canister	1. Potential leak and fires	1. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection systems; localized containment area, provision of splash plates on mechanical connections
2. Dropped object during maintenance	1. Dropped object on adjacent, operating pump	1. Potential damage and leak	1. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection systems; localized containment area.
			2. Lifting and maintenance procedures

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 7. ORV/SCV Vaporisers

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Leaks	1. Leaks from flange connections & small bore piping	1. Potential liquid spill; potential gas leaks; ignition and fire	1. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection system
	2. Ingress of LNG vapor into SCV in the event of leak in surrounding environment	2. Potential non-uniform combustion in SCV	2. Spill containment system with provision for high expansion foam
			3. SCV air intake provided with gas detection and shutdown of SCV
2. ORV tube failure	1. ORV tubes of Aluminium at about 80 to 100bar; seawater corrosion	1. Gas leak and potential ignition	1. ORV tubes provided with external coating to minimise corrosion effect
			2. Periodic inspection and maintenance; spare ORVs provided
			3. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection system
3. Heavy metals in sea water	1. Mercury content in sea water	1. Potential impacts if mercury content exceeds equipment vendor's specification for ORV	1. Since initial HAZID, Project has verified with vendors that the current mercury level in seawater does not exceed the equipment vendor's specification	11. Potential impact on ORV due to mercury content in sea water to be (re)confirmed during design based on vendor data
4. SCV tube failure	1. Tubes in water bath heater; possible damage due to corrosion	1. Gas leak and potential ignition	1. Hydrocarbon monitoring in flue gas stack from SCV
5. Low temp. hazard in vaporiser outlet piping	1. Heating failure in ORV/ SCV likely to result in low temp. liquid or gas in sendout	1. Possible damage to sendout piping (CS material); impact on gas turbine operation	1. Low temp. trip at vaporiser outlet
6. Overpressure in vaporiser outlet piping	1. Blocked condition	1. Potential loss of containment due to overpressure caused by heat of vaporisation under blocked condition	1. High pressure trip of HP pumps and vaporizers	17. Review, during detailed design, overpressure safeguards for piping downstream of vaporizer
			2. Relief valve to HP vent stack from each vaporiser outlet (vent stack designed for only 1 relief valve load)

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 8. Miscellaneous - Fuel gas, Gas heating, Gas Metering

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Leaks	1. Leak from flanges, piping connections; rupture of piping or equipment	1. Potential gas leak and fires	1. Gas and fire detection; emergency shutdown; fire protection system

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 9. Vent & Drain system

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Ignition of gases from vent stack	1. Due to lightning	1. Potential thermal radiation effects on adjoining equipment	1. Stack height will be determined based on thermal radiation threshold on adjoining equipment
			2. Snuffing system
2. Discharge of gas from vent stack	1. Venting from HP and LP vent stack	1. Potential slumping of cold vapour leading to accumulation in plant area or in vicinity	1. Stack height will be determined based on dispersion distance, taking into consideration receivers at ground and elevation. Gas expected to become warmer as it reaches vent stack	18. Analyze the pros and cons of a vent versus flare option to determine the appropriate path forward.
			2. Knock out drum will be provided for both vent stacks to knock out any liquid although not expected
3. Air ingress into vent header	1. Air ingress from vent stack	1. Potential for flame flashback upon ignition of vent vapours	1. Nitrogen purge
			2. Detailed design will address ignition sequence and purging requirements

System: 2. Plant Systems

Subsystem: 10. Utility & auxiliary systems

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Gas turbine hazards (at Soko)	1. Potential gas leak inside turbine enclosure	1. Potential fire and explosion	1. Turbine enclosure will be protected with detection and suppression systems per the manufacturers recommendation.
2. Transformer and switchgear at substation	1. Equipment failure	1. Potential fire and explosion	1. Protection of transformers will be provided per HK codes and applicable electrical codes and standards for process plants

System: 3. Construction Phase

Subsystem: 1. Blasting Operations during Initial Construction

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Explosives storage	1. Inadvertent ignition of material	1. Potential explosion; exposure of construction personnel	1. Explosives store will be specifically designed, located, and controlled as per HK regulations.
2. Explosives handling	1. Inadvertent ignition	1. Potential explosion; exposure of construction personnel	1. Handling only by Shotfirer
			2. Explosives handling will be specifically designed, located, and controlled as per HK regulations.
3. Blasting operations	1. Airborne fly rock	1. Potential personnel injury	1. Blasting will be controlled as per HK regulations.

System: 3. Construction Phase

Subsystem: 2. Third LNG Tank Construction - Expansion

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Construction activity for 3rd tank	1. Additional construction staff at the site during construction	1. Potential exposure to hazards from the operating facility	1. Separate risk assessment for the construction phase (for 3rd tank expansion)
			2. Simultaneous Operations procedures will be developed/implemented
			3. 3rd tank location will be such that blasting will not be required (or blasting would be accomplished during initial construction phase)

System: 3. Construction Phase

Subsystem: 3. Process System Construction - Expansion

Hazards/ Keywords	Description/ Causes	Consequences	Safeguards	Recommendations
1. Diesel storage during construction phase	1. Potential loss of containment	1. Potential environmental impact, potential fire	1. Containment and manual fire protection will be provided
2. Storage of construction materials including caustic, chemicals, compressed gas, paints/solvents	1. Potential toxic exposure, fire	1. Potential exposure of personnel	1. Construction operating and safety procedures
			2. Chemical and materials handling and storage per HK codes and MSDS
3. Construction and installation of new pumps, vaporiser as part of expansion	1. Potential equipment damage of adjoining equipment	1. Potential fire	1. Simultaneous operations controls will be developed.
			2. Tie-ins will be provided such that new equipment can be brought on line without requiring a plant shutdown.