This
Annex contains the details of the Frequency Analysis for the QRA study of the
terminal.
A
detailed discussion on all the hazard scenarios identified was given in Annex 13A5. This included consideration
of natural hazards, external impact as well as internal process hazards. In all
cases, the generic failure frequencies were found to be applicable. These
failure frequencies are summarised in this section.
Table 1.1 lists all the
failure frequencies adopted for the various release scenarios. Codes are
assigned for various source terms. Refer to Annex
13A7 for code definitions.
Table
1.1 LNG
Release Event Frequencies
|
No. of Items |
Length of Section (m) |
Hole Size (mm) |
Initiating Event Frequency |
Unit |
Reference |
|
|
L01 |
1 |
450 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley [1] |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
L02 |
3 |
20 |
10 |
4.05E-03 |
per year |
COVO Study [2] |
|
|
|
|
25 |
4.05E-03 |
||
|
|
|
|
50 |
4.05E-03 |
||
|
|
|
|
100 |
4.05E-04 |
||
|
|
|
|
FB |
4.05E-05 |
||
|
L03 |
2 |
120 |
10 |
1.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
3.00E-08 |
|
|
|
L04 |
1 |
70 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
L05 |
2 |
380 |
10 |
1.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
3.00E-08 |
|
|
|
L06 |
1 |
N/A |
10 |
1.00E-05 |
per year |
Crossthwaite et al [3] |
|
|
|
|
25 |
5.00E-06 |
||
|
|
|
|
50 |
5.00E-06 |
||
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-06 |
||
|
|
|
|
FB |
1.00E-06 |
||
|
G07 |
1 |
500 |
10 |
1.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
3.00E-08 |
|
|
|
G08 |
1 |
60 |
10 |
1.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
3.00E-08 |
|
|
|
G09 |
1 |
450 |
10 |
1.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
3.00E-08 |
|
|
|
G10 |
1 |
40 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
G11 |
1 |
120 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
G12 |
1 |
120 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
G13 |
1 |
50 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
G14 |
1 |
20 |
10 |
4.05E-03 |
per year |
COVO Study |
|
|
|
|
25 |
4.05E-03 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
4.05E-03 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
4.05E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
4.05E-05 |
|
|
|
P15 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1.00E-04 |
per year |
COVO Study |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
1.00E-05 |
|
|
|
P16 |
2 |
1 |
10 |
1.00E-04 |
per year |
COVO Study |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
1.00E-05 |
|
|
|
P17 |
5 |
10 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
P18 |
5 |
10 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
P19 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
P20 |
1 |
150 |
10 |
3.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
3.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
5.00E-08 |
|
|
|
P21 |
1 |
120 |
10 |
1.00E-07 |
per meter per year |
Hawksley |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-07 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
7.00E-08 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
3.00E-08 |
|
|
|
P22 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1.00E-04 |
per year |
COVO Study |
|
|
|
|
25 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
50 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
100 |
1.00E-04 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
FB |
1.00E-05 |
|
|
|
T23 |
3 |
N/A |
Rupture |
1.00E-08 |
per tank per year |
“Purple Book” [4] |
The
frequency of various outcomes following a loss of containment event is
estimated using an event tree model. The various outcomes considered include
pool fire, jet fire, flash fire and vapour cloud explosions for liquid
releases; jet fire and flash fire for continuous gas releases and fireball and
flash fire for instantaneous gas releases. Event Tree Analysis is used to
describe and analyse how an initiating event may lead to a number of different
outcomes, depending upon such factors as the successful implementation of the
various emergency response measures and relevant protective safety systems in
place.
A
generic event tree used for this study is shown in Figure 1.1. The contributing factors taken into account in the
event trees are discussed below.
Figure
1.1 Generic
Event Tree
|
Detection
& Shutdown Fails |
Immediate
Ignition |
Delayed
Ignition (1) |
Vapour
Cloud Explosion |
Delayed
Ignition (2) |
Event Outcome |
|||||
|
|
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pool fire/ Jet fire |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No |
|
No |
|
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
|
Vapour cloud explosion |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No |
|
No |
|
|
Flash fire over plant area |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Yes |
Flash fire full extent |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No |
Unignited release |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Yes |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Pool fire/ Jet fire |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No |
|
Yes |
|
Yes |
|
|
Vapour cloud explosion |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No |
|
No |
|
|
Flash fire over plant area |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Yes |
Flash fire full extent |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
No |
Unignited release |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Detection
and Shutdown
For
loss of containment events from piping and equipment, it has been assumed that
detection and shutdown would occur 90% of the time (based on safety integrity
level 1 for emergency shutdown systems which has an associated probability of
failure on demand of 0.1).
As
discussed in Annex 13A7 on the
consequence analysis, if detection and shutdown is successful, a 2 minute
release is assumed based on the Emergency Shutdown Device (ESD) provisions in
the design (Annex 13D). For shutdown
failure, a 10-minute release is assumed. The exception to this is the unloading
arms for which 2-minute and 30s releases are considered for isolation failure
and isolation successful. The release duration does not have a major influence
on the hazard distances determined from dispersion modelling, but slightly
different ignition probabilities are assumed for these two cases.
Immediate
Ignition
Immediate
ignition of an LNG release would result in a pool fire, a jet fire or a
fireball (for instantaneous gas releases). For a liquid release under pressure,
a jet fire is produced. For a non-momentum liquid release, the liquid is
assumed to spill onto the ground producing a pool fire. Gas releases are all
pressurised releases and ignition would result in a jet fire. For instantaneous
gas releases following a rupture failure, a fire ball is assumed to occur.
In
the event of non-ignition, a cloud of natural gas would be formed by the gas
release or evaporating liquid pool. A flash fire would occur if this cloud were
subsequently ignited.
Delayed
Ignition
If
immediate ignition does not occur, the dispersing cloud of natural gas may subsequently
be ignited. Two delayed ignition scenarios are considered. The first, “delayed
ignition 1”, takes into account the possibility that ignition could occur
within the plant area due to the presence of ignition sources on site. The
second, “delayed ignition 2”, assumes ignition occurs after the cloud has
dispersed to its full (steady state) extent.
Delayed
ignition for an LNG storage tank failure was treated a little differently given
the much larger scale of the release. Vaporisation from the liquid pool was
observed to be highly transient in nature. The liquid pool expands to its
maximum extent after several minutes and then begins to shrink again as the LNG
pool “dries up”. The vapour cloud was observed to expand rapidly with the
initial pool expansion. Once vaporisation diminishes, however, a sizable cloud
of gas within the flammability limits remains and is convected downwind,
gradually shrinking as it goes. Delayed ignition 1 was therefore assigned to
the cloud at its maximum footprint area, while delayed ignition 2 was applied
to the remnants of the cloud at the maximum downwind extent. Different ignition
probabilities were also assigned to LNG tank release (Section 1.3).
If
delayed ignition does not occur, the vapour cloud disperses with no effect.
Vapour
Cloud Explosion
If a delayed ignition occurs within the plant area (delayed
ignition 1), the possibility of an explosion occurring within the congested
space of the process area is considered.
The
overall ignition probabilities used in this study were adapted from the Cox,
Lees and Ang model [5] and are
summarised in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 Ignition
Probabilities from Cox, Lees and Ang Model
|
Leak
size |
Ignition probability |
Explosion probability
given ignition |
|
|
|
Gas release |
Liquid
release |
|
|
Major (1-50 kg/s) |
0.07 |
0.03 |
0.12 |
|
Massive
(>50 kg/s) |
0.30 |
0.08 |
0.3 |
These
ignition probabilities were distributed amongst immediate and delayed ignition.
One third of the ignition probability was assumed to be immediate ignition. The
remainder was assigned to delayed ignition with about 90% being attributed to
delayed ignition 1. The total ignition probabilities assumed in the current
study (Table 1.3) are therefore
similar the values quoted in Table 1.2
[5]. In Table 1.3, 10 and 25mm holes
are considered “small leaks”, while 50 and 100mm holes are considered “large
leaks”.
Table 1.3 Ignition
Probabilities Assumed
|
|
Immediate
Ignition |
Delayed
Ignition 1 |
Delayed
Ignition 2 |
Delayed
Ignition Probability |
Total
Ignition Probability |
|
Liquid small
leak |
0.01 |
0.035 |
0.005 |
0.04 |
0.05 |
|
Liquid large
leak/rupture |
0.08 |
0.18 |
0.02 |
0.2 |
0.28 |
|
Gas small
leak |
0.02 |
0.045 |
0.005 |
0.05 |
0.07 |
|
Gas large
leak/rupture |
0.1 |
0.2 |
0.02 |
0.22 |
0.32 |
For isolation failure scenarios, the delayed ignition
probabilities given in Table 1.3 are doubled. The longer duration and larger inventory release from a
10-minute release is assumed to make it more likely that ignition takes place.
LNG
Storage Tank Failure Ignition Probabilities
Special
consideration was given to the ignition probabilities for LNG storage tank
failure scenarios. Given the much larger scale of release for this scenario
compared to all others, it is more likely that the vapour cloud will find an
ignition source and so it was conservatively assumed that the total ignition
probability is 1. The distribution of this probability (Table 1.4) was made with consideration of the location of likely
ignition sources. Immediate ignition was deemed fairly likely given that
ignition sources will be present on site and at the neighbouring power station.
A value of 0.7 was adopted. Delayed ignition 1 is applied to the cloud once it
reaches its maximum size. This occurs beyond the plant boundary and because of
marine traffic, a number of villages and other industrial sites within the
vicinity, much of the remaining ignition probability was assigned to delayed
ignition 1. A value of 0.2 was assigned. The remaining probability of 0.1 was
assigned to delayed ignition 2. Given the characteristics of the site and
surroundings, it was regarded as relatively unlikely for the vapour cloud to
travel a significant distance downwind before finding an ignition source.
Table 1.4 LNG
Storage Tank Release Ignition Probabilities
|
|
Ignition
Probability |
|
Immediate ignition Delayed ignition 1 Delayed ignition 2 |
0.7 0.2 0.1 |
A summary of outcome frequencies for all the events considered in the
LNG terminal HA study is listed in Table
1.5.
Detail
of the nomenclature is as follows:
IS
= Isolation Success
IF = Isolation Failure
FF1 = Flash Fire over Plant Area
FF2 = Flash Fire, full extent
PLF = Pool Fire
JTF = Jet Fire
VCE = Vapour Cloud Explosion
FBL = Fire Ball
FB = Full Bore
NE = No Effect
Table
1.5 Outcome
Frequencies Summary
|
Release Event |
Release Scenario |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
10mm |
25mm |
50mm |
100mm |
IS_FB |
IF_FB |
|
L01_FF2 |
1.42E-10 |
1.42E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
6.79E-10 |
7.54E-11 |
|
L01_FF1 |
7.20E-10 |
7.20E-10 |
1.16E-09 |
6.38E-09 |
5.22E-09 |
5.80E-10 |
|
L01_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
8.00E-10 |
8.00E-09 |
|
|
|
L01_PLF |
|
|
|
|
3.60E-09 |
4.00E-10 |
|
L01_VCE |
3.09E-10 |
3.09E-10 |
4.97E-10 |
2.73E-09 |
2.24E-09 |
2.48E-10 |
|
L02_FF2 |
1.93E-06 |
1.93E-06 |
1.93E-06 |
1.93E-07 |
5.50E-07 |
6.11E-08 |
|
L02_FF1 |
7.72E-05 |
7.72E-05 |
7.72E-05 |
7.72E-06 |
6.04E-06 |
6.71E-07 |
|
L02_JTF |
4.05E-05 |
4.05E-05 |
4.05E-05 |
4.05E-06 |
|
|
|
L02_PLF |
|
|
|
|
2.92E-06 |
3.24E-07 |
|
L03_FF2 |
4.78E-11 |
4.78E-11 |
1.06E-10 |
1.06E-10 |
4.07E-10 |
4.53E-11 |
|
L03_FF1 |
3.47E-10 |
3.47E-10 |
1.16E-09 |
6.38E-09 |
4.47E-09 |
4.97E-10 |
|
L03_JTF |
1.00E-10 |
1.00E-10 |
5.60E-10 |
5.60E-09 |
|
|
|
L03_PLF |
|
|
|
|
2.16E-09 |
2.40E-10 |
|
L04_FF2 |
1.42E-10 |
1.42E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
6.79E-10 |
7.54E-11 |
|
L04_FF1 |
7.20E-10 |
7.20E-10 |
1.16E-09 |
6.38E-09 |
5.22E-09 |
5.80E-10 |
|
L04_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
8.00E-10 |
|
|
|
|
L04_PLF |
|
|
|
8.00E-09 |
3.60E-09 |
4.00E-10 |
|
L04_VCE |
3.09E-10 |
3.09E-10 |
4.97E-10 |
2.73E-09 |
2.24E-09 |
2.48E-10 |
|
L05_FF2 |
4.78E-11 |
4.78E-11 |
1.06E-10 |
1.06E-10 |
4.07E-10 |
4.53E-11 |
|
L05_FF1 |
3.47E-10 |
3.47E-10 |
1.16E-09 |
6.38E-09 |
4.47E-09 |
4.97E-10 |
|
L05_JTF |
1.00E-10 |
1.00E-10 |
5.60E-10 |
5.60E-09 |
|
|
|
L05_PLF |
|
|
|
|
2.16E-09 |
2.40E-10 |
|
L06_FF2 |
4.78E-09 |
4.78E-09 |
7.54E-09 |
7.54E-09 |
1.36E-08 |
1.51E-09 |
|
L06_FF1 |
1.33E-07 |
1.33E-07 |
3.19E-07 |
3.19E-07 |
1.04E-07 |
1.16E-08 |
|
L06_JTF |
1.00E-07 |
1.00E-07 |
4.00E-07 |
4.00E-07 |
|
|
|
L06_PLF |
|
|
|
|
7.20E-08 |
8.00E-09 |
|
L06_VCE |
5.72E-08 |
5.72E-08 |
1.37E-07 |
1.37E-07 |
4.47E-08 |
4.97E-09 |
|
G07_FF2 |
4.68E-11 |
4.68E-11 |
1.01E-10 |
1.01E-10 |
3.89E-10 |
4.32E-11 |
|
G07_FF1 |
4.41E-10 |
4.41E-10 |
1.26E-09 |
6.93E-09 |
4.86E-09 |
5.40E-10 |
|
G07_JTF |
2.00E-10 |
2.00E-10 |
7.00E-10 |
7.00E-09 |
|
3.00E-10 |
|
G07_FBL |
|
|
|
|
2.70E-09 |
|
|
G08_FF2 |
4.68E-11 |
4.68E-11 |
1.01E-10 |
1.01E-10 |
3.89E-10 |
4.32E-11 |
|
G08_FF1 |
4.41E-10 |
4.41E-10 |
1.26E-09 |
6.93E-09 |
4.86E-09 |
5.40E-10 |
|
G08_JTF |
2.00E-10 |
2.00E-10 |
7.00E-10 |
7.00E-09 |
|
3.00E-10 |
|
G08_FBL |
|
|
|
|
2.70E-09 |
|
|
G09_FF2 |
4.68E-11 |
4.68E-11 |
1.01E-10 |
1.01E-10 |
3.89E-10 |
4.32E-11 |
|
G09_FF1 |
4.41E-10 |
4.41E-10 |
1.26E-09 |
6.93E-09 |
4.86E-09 |
5.40E-10 |
|
G09_JTF |
2.00E-10 |
2.00E-10 |
7.00E-10 |
7.00E-09 |
|
3.00E-10 |
|
G09_FBL |
|
|
|
|
2.70E-09 |
|
|
G10_FF2 |
1.40E-10 |
1.40E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
6.48E-10 |
7.20E-11 |
|
G10_FF1 |
1.32E-09 |
1.32E-09 |
1.80E-09 |
9.90E-09 |
8.10E-09 |
9.00E-10 |
|
G10_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
1.00E-09 |
1.00E-08 |
4.50E-09 |
5.00E-10 |
|
G10_FBL |
|
|
|
|
4.50E-09 |
|
|
G11_FF2 |
1.40E-10 |
1.40E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
6.48E-10 |
7.20E-11 |
|
G11_FF1 |
1.32E-09 |
1.32E-09 |
1.80E-09 |
9.90E-09 |
8.10E-09 |
9.00E-10 |
|
G11_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
1.00E-09 |
1.00E-08 |
|
5.00E-10 |
|
G11_FBL |
|
|
|
|
4.50E-09 |
|
|
G12_FF2 |
1.40E-10 |
1.40E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
6.48E-10 |
7.20E-11 |
|
G12_FF1 |
1.32E-09 |
1.32E-09 |
1.80E-09 |
9.90E-09 |
8.10E-09 |
9.00E-10 |
|
G12_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
1.00E-09 |
1.00E-08 |
|
5.00E-10 |
|
G12_FBL |
|
|
|
|
4.50E-09 |
|
|
G13_FF2 |
1.40E-10 |
1.40E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
6.48E-10 |
7.20E-11 |
|
G13_FF1 |
1.32E-09 |
1.32E-09 |
1.80E-09 |
9.90E-09 |
8.10E-09 |
9.00E-10 |
|
G13_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
1.00E-09 |
1.00E-08 |
|
5.00E-10 |
|
G13_FBL |
|
|
|
|
4.50E-09 |
|
|
G14_FF2 |
1.90E-06 |
1.90E-06 |
1.90E-06 |
1.90E-07 |
5.18E-07 |
5.76E-08 |
|
G14_FF1 |
9.82E-05 |
9.82E-05 |
9.82E-05 |
9.82E-06 |
6.48E-06 |
7.20E-07 |
|
G14_JTF |
8.10E-05 |
8.10E-05 |
8.10E-05 |
8.10E-06 |
|
4.00E-07 |
|
G14_FBL |
|
|
|
|
3.60E-06 |
|
|
P15_FF2 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
1.36E-07 |
1.51E-08 |
|
P15_FF1 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.49E-06 |
1.66E-07 |
|
P15_JTF |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
|
8.00E-08 |
|
P15_FBL |
|
|
|
|
7.20E-07 |
|
|
P16_FF2 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
1.36E-07 |
1.51E-08 |
|
P16_FF1 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.49E-06 |
1.66E-07 |
|
P16_JTF |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
|
8.00E-08 |
|
P16_FBL |
|
|
|
|
7.20E-07 |
|
|
P17_FF2 |
1.40E-10 |
1.40E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
6.48E-10 |
7.20E-11 |
|
P17_FF1 |
1.32E-09 |
1.32E-09 |
1.80E-09 |
9.90E-09 |
8.10E-09 |
9.00E-10 |
|
P17_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
1.00E-09 |
1.00E-08 |
|
5.00E-10 |
|
P17_FBL |
|
|
|
|
4.50E-09 |
|
|
P18_FF2 |
1.40E-10 |
1.40E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
1.44E-10 |
6.48E-10 |
7.20E-11 |
|
P18_FF1 |
1.32E-09 |
1.32E-09 |
1.80E-09 |
9.90E-09 |
8.10E-09 |
9.00E-10 |
|
P18_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
1.00E-09 |
1.00E-08 |
|
5.00E-10 |
|
P18_FBL |
|
|
|
|
4.50E-09 |
|
|
P19_FF2 |
1.42E-10 |
1.42E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
6.79E-10 |
7.54E-11 |
|
P19_FF1 |
7.20E-10 |
7.20E-10 |
1.16E-09 |
6.38E-09 |
5.22E-09 |
5.80E-10 |
|
P19_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
|
|
|
|
|
P19_PLF |
|
|
8.00E-10 |
8.00E-09 |
3.60E-09 |
4.00E-10 |
|
P19_VCE |
3.09E-10 |
3.09E-10 |
4.97E-10 |
2.73E-09 |
2.24E-09 |
2.48E-10 |
|
P20_FF2 |
1.42E-10 |
1.42E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
1.51E-10 |
6.79E-10 |
7.54E-11 |
|
P20_FF1 |
1.03E-09 |
1.03E-09 |
1.66E-09 |
9.11E-09 |
7.45E-09 |
8.28E-10 |
|
P20_JTF |
6.00E-10 |
6.00E-10 |
8.00E-10 |
|
|
|
|
P20_PLF |
|
|
|
8.00E-09 |
3.60E-09 |
4.00E-10 |
|
P21_FF2 |
4.78E-11 |
4.78E-11 |
1.06E-10 |
1.06E-10 |
4.07E-10 |
4.53E-11 |
|
P21_FF1 |
3.47E-10 |
3.47E-10 |
1.16E-09 |
6.38E-09 |
4.47E-09 |
4.97E-10 |
|
P21_JTF |
1.00E-10 |
1.00E-10 |
5.60E-10 |
5.60E-09 |
|
|
|
P21_PLF |
|
|
|
|
2.16E-09 |
2.40E-10 |
|
P22_FF2 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
4.78E-08 |
1.36E-07 |
1.51E-08 |
|
P22_FF1 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
1.91E-06 |
8.10E-09 |
1.66E-07 |
|
P22_JTF |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
1.00E-06 |
|
8.00E-08 |
|
P22_FBL |
|
|
|
|
7.20E-07 |
|
|
Release Event |
Release Scenario |
|
|
|
Low Level |
High Level |
|
T23_FF2 |
2.60E-10 |
7.40E-10 |
|
T23_FF1 |
5.20E-10 |
1.48E-09 |
|
T23_PLF |
1.82E-09 |
5.18E-09 |
[1] Hawksley,
J.L., Some Social, Technical and Economic Aspects of the Risks of Large Plants,
CHEMRAWN III, 1984.
[2] Rijnmond
Public Authority, A Risk Analysis of Six Potentially Hazardous Industrial
Objects in the Rijnmond Area – A Pilot Study, COVO, D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
Dordrecht, 1982.
[3] Crossthwaite,
P.J., Fitzpatrick, R.D. & Hurst, N.W., Risk Assessment for the Siting of
Developments Near Liquefied Petroleum Gas Installations, IChemE Symposium
Series No 110, 1988.
[4] TNO, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (The Purple
Book), Report CPR 18E, The
[5] Cox,
Lees and Ang, Classification of Hazardous Locations, IChemE.