12.1.1
Background
12.1.1.1
This
section of the EIA presents a summary of the analysis and findings of the
Hazard to Life Assessment (also referred as Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA))
undertaken for the proposed Kwun Tong Line Extension (KTE) project.
12.1.1.2
The
railway project consists of an approximately 2.5 km long extension from the
overrun tunnels at Yau Ma Tei Station (YMT) to a new terminal station at
Whampoa (WHA) via a station at Ho Man Tin (HOM) will become an interchange
station with the proposed Shatin to Central Link (SCL) beneath a future
property development at the site of the demolished Valley Road Estate.
12.1.1.3
The
selection of construction methods has been optimised to minimise, as far as possible, the use of explosives depending
on the type of material to be excavated. However, a significant amount of
explosives will be required for the construction of tunnels, station and adits.
It is envisaged that the following items of works for KTE will involve
blasting:
· A 2.6 km long underground tunnel connecting the overrun tunnels at Yau Ma Tei Station (YMT) to a new terminal station at Whampoa (WHA); the alignment is chosen to avoid all existing highway and building foundations.
· Ho Man Tin Station – an intermediate station to interchange with the proposed Shatin to Central Link (SCL).
12.1.1.4
Excavation
by blasting will be generally ongoing from the beginning of November 2011 to
the end of December 2012.
12.1.1.5
To
enable a timely delivery of explosives to site and in order to meet the
proposed construction work programme, one temporary Explosives Storage Magazine
(Magazine) is required. It will be located at Tseung Kwon O Area 137. The site
was selected considering the distance to the work areas as well as other
constraints such as land availability, minimum separation distances from
temporary magazine to populated area, accessibility by Mines Division, etc.
(ref.1, ref. 21).
12.1.1.6
With
reference to the EIA Study Brief (ESB-188/2008), if there is use of explosives
for the construction activities and the storage or blasting location is in
close vicinity to populated areas and/or Potentially Hazardous Installation
site(s) along the Project alignment a hazard to life assessment is required.
12.1.1.7
The
QRA for the
storage and transport of explosives relates to the construction phase of the
project, in which blasting activities are expected. There will be no explosives
handled during the operational phase.
12.1.1.8
The
Hazard to Life assessment under this section of the EIA, addresses, in
particular, the following:
·
Storage
of explosives at the proposed temporary magazine (cartridged emulsion, cast boosters,
detonating cord and detonators) including handling of explosives within the
temporary magazine site; and
· Transport of explosives to the delivery points.
12.1.1.9
Further
details of the QRA for the Project are presented in the Appendix 12.1.
12.2
Legislation Requirement and Evaluation Criteria
12.2.1.1 The key legislation and guidelines that are considered relevant to the development of the proposed Kwun Tong Line Extension (KTE) project are as follows:
·
Dangerous
Goods Ordinance, Chapter 295;
·
Environmental
Impact Assessment Ordinance (EIAO), Chapter 499; and
· The EIA Study Brief (ESB-188/2008), Section 3.4.6.
12.2.3
EIAO Technical Memorandum (EIAO-TM)
12.2.3.1 The requirement for a QRA of projects that involve the storage and transport of dangerous goods where a risk to life is a key issue with respect to the Hong Kong Government Risk Guidelines (HKRG) is specified in Section 12 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance Technical Memorandum (EIAO-TM).
12.2.3.2
The relevant
authority for a QRA study relating to a temporary explosives
magazine storage facility and the transport of the explosives is the
Environmental Protection Department (EPD), as specified in Annex 22 of the
EIAO-TM.
12.2.3.3
Annex 4 of the EIAO-TM
specifies the Individual and Societal Risk Guidelines.
12.2.4
12.2.4.1
Individual risk
is the predicted increase in the chance of fatality per year to an individual due
to a potential hazard. The individual risk guidelines require that the maximum
level of individual risk should not exceed 1 in 100,000 per year i.e. 1 x10-5
per year.
12.2.4.2
Societal risk expresses the risks to the whole
population. The HKRG is presented graphically in Figure 12.1. It is expressed in terms of lines plotting the
frequency (F) of N or more deaths in the population from incidents at the
installation. Two F-N risk lines are used in the HKRG that demark “acceptable”
or “unacceptable” societal risks. The intermediate region indicates the
acceptability of societal risk is borderline and should be reduced to a level
which is “as low as is reasonably practicable” (ALARP). It seeks to ensure that
all practicable and cost effective measures that can reduce risk will be
considered.
12.3
Study Objectives and Methodology
12.3.1.1
The objective of the QRA study is to assess the
risk to life of the general public from the hazards that arise from the storage
and transport of the explosives that are required to facilitate the
construction of the Project. The results of the QRA should then be compared
with the HKRG.
12.3.1.2
The
detailed requirements of the study are given in Section 3.4.6 of the EIA study
brief. The main requirements are:
·
To
identify hazardous scenarios associated with the storage and transport of
explosives; and then determine a set of relevant scenarios to be included in a
QRA;
·
To
execute a QRA of the set of hazardous scenarios determined, expressing
population risks in both individual and societal terms;
·
To
compare the individual and societal risks with the Criteria for Evaluating
Hazard to Life stipulated in Annex 4 of the EIAO-TM; and
·
To identify and assess practicable and
cost-effective risk mitigation measures (e.g. selection of the shortest
practicable road transport routes to and from the storage facility).
12.3.1.3
The methodology of the hazard assessment should be
consistent with previous studies having similar issues.
12.3.1.4
The
elements of the QRA are shown schematically in Figure 12.2. It includes the following:
·
Collection
and review of relevant data for the proposed temporary Magazine, the transport from
the temporary Magazine, and the use of explosives at the works area, as well as
population and vulnerable receptors, such as slopes, retaining walls etc., in
the vicinity of the storage, the tunnel construction and proposed transport
routes;
·
Hazard
identification. A review of literature and accident databases were undertaken
and updated. These formed the basis for identifying all the hazardous scenarios
for the QRA study;
· Frequency estimation. The frequencies, or the likelihood, of the various outcomes that result from the hazards associated with the storage and transport of explosives was taken primarily from the XRL study (ref. 2), which has been accepted by the relevant authorities. Where necessary, to consider specific factors applicable for the Project, recent accident statistics, and to reflect the current knowledge on the explosives’ properties, these frequencies were modified or updated making reference, as far as possible to published references; such as the previous Hong Kong studies , UK HSE, US DoD, Dutch TNO, latest accident statistics from the Transport Department and Fire Service Department, etc.;
·
For
all identified hazards, the frequency assessment has been documented and the
consequences were modelled;
·
The
frequency model related to the transport and storage of explosives was taken
from the ERM 2009 study (ref. 2);
·
The
consequence model employed in this study is the ESTC model (ref.3), developed
by the UK Health and Safety Commission (HSC). Although, there have been a
number of recent studies suggesting that the ESTC (2000) models should be
reviewed for applicability to explosive stores and transport, these models are
still the recommended models in the UK and adopted in the WIL (ref. 4) and XRL
(ref. 2) studies;
· The consequence and frequency data were subsequently combined using ERM’s in-house proprietary software Riskplot TM to produce the required risk estimates. The transport part of the risk assessment, consistently with the XRL study (ref. 2), uses an in-house Explosive Transport GIS Risk Assessment tool (E-TRA) developed to account for three-dimensional blast effects on buildings and the effect of accidental explosions on elevated roads. It also accounts for traffic jam scenarios which could occur in some accidental scenarios as reported in ref. 5. The E-TRA model is summarised in Section 3.2 of Appendix 12.1 and has been validated against Riskplot TM.
12.3.1.5
Finally, the
results from the risk assessment were compared to the EIAO-TM Criteria.
Recommendations have been made where required to ensure compliance with EIAO-TM
Criteria, relevant best practice, and to reduce the overall risk levels.
12.3.1.6
The
methodology used in this hazard assessment is consistent with previous studies.
Details of the analysis can be found in Appendix 12.1.
12.4.1
Project Overview
12.4.1.1
The
Project comprises the following key elements (ref. 19):
·
The
approximately 0.5 km tunnel from the Club de Recreio (CDR) Shaft to the Yau Ma
Tei overrun tunnels;
·
The
approximately 0.7 km tunnel from the Club de Recreio (CDR) Shaft to the west
end of Ho Man Tin Station Platform;
·
The
Ho Man Tin Station Platform(West - 0.13 km and East – 0.09 km);
·
The
Ho Man Tin Station (Open Cut Scheme, ref. 20);
·
The
approximately 0.05 km tunnel from the east end of Ho Man Tin Station Platform
to Fat Kwong Street (FKS) Shaft;
·
The
approximately 0.5 km tunnel from the FKS Shaft to Whampoa Station; and
· Construction of a temporary above ground explosives magazine site at Tseung Kwon O Area 137.
12.4.1.2
The
proposed Project alignment and work areas are shown in Figure 12.3.
12.4.1.3
Excavation
in rock by blasting will be ongoing generally from November 2011 to December
2012 for a significant length of the tunnels, station and adits.
12.4.1.4
Two
categories of explosives will be used for the construction of tunnels and
adits by Drill and
Blast methods. These are:
·
Initiating
explosives: cartridged emulsion explosives, cast boosters, detonating cord and
detonators; and
· Blasting explosives: bulk emulsion explosives or ammonium nitrate-fuel oil (ANFO) manufactured at the blast site or, in close proximity to sensitive receivers (i.e. with MIC less than 2 kg), cartridged emulsion explosives.
12.4.1.5
Cartridged
emulsion, cast boosters and detonating cord will be delivered from the
temporary explosives magazine to the various construction sites by the
appointed contractor using Mines Division licensed trucks. These explosives are
classified as an explosive Class 1.1D under United Nations (UN) Classification (ref.
6) and as a Category 1 (Explosive and blasting agents) Dangerous Goods under
the Hong Kong Dangerous Goods Ordinance.
12.4.1.6
Detonators
will also be used to initiate the blast at the working face. As used in this
project, they are classified as Class 1.4B or 1.4S explosives under the UN
classification system and Category 1 (Explosives and Blasting Agents) under the
Hong Kong Dangerous Goods Ordinance, and will be transported from temporary
magazine to work areas by a dedicated truck, which is identical to, but
independent of the truck carrying the emulsion explosives and detonating cord.
Detonators approved for use in
12.4.1.7
Explosives
classified as Class 1.1 are defined as substances and articles which have a
mass explosion hazard while Class 1.4 explosives present no significant hazard
outside the packaging. To comply with the classification, it is required to
ensure that the explosive is safe to transport, to pass a series of
classification tests in accordance with the UN test manual, 2003 (ref.7). Due
to different properties of explosives, a compatibility class is also assigned,
as applicable to this Project. Type “B” is defined as “An article containing a
primary explosive substance and not containing two or more protective features”
and type “S” is defined as “The substance or article so packed or designed that
any hazardous effects arising from accidental functioning are limited to the
extent that they do not significantly hinder or prohibit fire fighting or other
emergency response efforts in the immediate vicinity of the package”.
12.4.1.8
Bulk
emulsion precursor will be transported to the blast sites by the appointed
third party supplier. It is classified as an oxidising agent Class 5.1 under
the UN Classification system and as Category 7, i.e. strong supporter of
combustion under the Hong Kong Dangerous Goods Ordinance. Prior to sensitizing,
it is not considered as an explosive, and hence outside the scope of this QRA.
Bulk emulsion will not be stored within the temporary magazine.
12.4.1.9
Depending on blasting requirements, ANFO may be
used in this Project. ANFO is classified as UN HD 1.1D under UN Classification.
It consists of an oxidizing substance mixed with 6% by weight of diesel fuel
oil. ANFO will be produced at the construction work area by using a mixing
truck and hence outside the scope of this QRA.
12.4.2
Statutory/ Licensing Requirements
12.4.2.1
The statutory / licensing requirements with respect
to the explosives (Cat. 1 Dangerous Goods) or the oxidizing substances (Cat. 7
Dangerous Goods) used to prepare explosives at the construction work area as well
as relevant government departments/ authorities’ advice and practice on the
proposed transport and storage of explosives for the blasting activities are
summarized below.
Category 1 Explosives and Blasting Agents
·
Responsible
authority: The Commissioner of Mines; and
·
Applicable regulations/ guidance
notes:
-
Supply
of detonators, cast boosters and cartridged emulsion explosives (under the
Dangerous Goods (General) Regulations Cap. 295B);
-
Approved
explosives for blasting in
-
Blast
design (under the Dangerous Goods (General) Regulations Cap. 295B);
-
Blast
loading and execution (under the Dangerous Goods (General) Regulations Cap.
295B);
-
Removal
of explosives (under Regulation 4 of the Dangerous Goods (General) regulations
Cap. 295B);
-
Approval
of an explosives delivery vehicle (under CEDD’s “Guidance Note on Requirements
for Approval of an Explosives Delivery Vehicle” (ref. 8));
-
Explosives
delivery vehicle design features and safety requirements (under CEDD’s
“Guidance Note on Requirements for Approval of an Explosive Delivery Vehicle”
(ref. 8);
-
Temporary explosives magazine (under CEDD’s document “How to Apply for
a Mode A Explosives Store Licence” (ref. 9)) including storage capacity;
-
Explosives
produced at site (under Regulation 31A of the Dangerous Goods (General)
Regulations Cap. 295B); and
-
Explosives
load per truck (in accordance with the Removal Permit under the Dangerous Goods
(General) Regulations Cap. 295B).
Category 7 Strong Supporters of Combustion
·
Responsible
authority: Fire Services Department; and
·
Applicable regulations:
-
Storage
of oxidizing agents (under Dangerous Goods (General) Regulations Cap. 295B)
12.4.2.2
This
Project will use cartridged emulsion and cast booster explosives as initiating
explosives. For blasting explosives, bulk emulsion or ANFO will be used; however, cartridged
emulsion explosives may be used as blasting explosives in close proximity to
sensitive receivers. Therefore, the storage and transport requirements for
explosives are the minimum required quantities for the Project.
12.4.3
Temporary Storage Magazine Details
12.4.3.1
A
temporary magazine site is proposed to be built at Tseung Kwan O (TKO) Area
137. The design, construction and operation of the temporary magazine will
comply with the general requirements from the Commissioner of Mines (ref. 9).
12.4.3.2
The
temporary magazine is generally designed to store sufficient quantities of
explosives for two days so as to allow blasting to be carried out 24 hours per
day and provide a buffer in the event of delivery interruption to the temporary
magazine by Mines Division.
12.4.3.3
The
temporary Magazine is required to serve the delivery points at Ho Man Tin (HOM)
Station, Fat Kwong Street (FKS) and Club de Recreio (CDR) shafts. Potential
magazine site locations in
12.4.3.4
The
proposed temporary Magazine will have five stores each containing 300 kg. All quantities of
explosives are represented in gross weight, unless they are clearly specified
as TNT eqv kg. A storage chamber for detonators equivalent to two days supply
is provided next to each explosives chamber. The detonators have a very low
explosive mass and contain less than 1 gram of high explosives per detonator.
The net explosives quantity within each detonator chamber will be less than 2
to 3 kg.
12.4.3.5
The
work areas and the associated explosives using contract packaging for the
temporary magazine are shown in Table
12.1.
12.4.3.6
Each
of the temporary magazine buildings is a single-storey, detached and bunded
structure, which is fenced and secured in accordance with the Commissioner of
Mines’ requirements. Details of the requirements are defined in the CEDD
document “How to Apply for a Mode A Explosives Store Licence” (ref. 9). Surface
road access suitable for 11-tonne trucks is also provided for the delivery of explosives.
Table
12.1: Project
Contracts and Work Areas (Blasting only)
|
Magazine
Storage Requirement per contract |
Works
Area |
Blast
Faces |
Delivery
Point |
|
1,500 kg (300
kg x 5) |
Ho Man Tin Station |
- Open Cut Scheme |
Ho Man Tin ( |
|
Fat |
- Single bore tunnel drives west to HOM –
continues into the east end of Ho Man Tin Station Platform - Single bore tunnel drives east to Whampoa
Station |
Fat |
|
|
Club De Recreio Shaft |
- Twin tunnels drive west to YMT - Twin tunnels drive east to HOM – continues
into the west end of Ho Man Tin Station Platform |
Wiley Road |
12.4.3.7
Mines
Division will deliver explosives to the temporary Magazine on a daily basis
(once per day), from where explosives will be transferred to the work areas by
the contractor for the daily or twice-daily blasts depending on requirements
for construction. Loads will be limited to a maximum of 200 kg per truck
or less in accordance with the Removal Permit issued by Mines Division.
12.4.3.8
The
explosives will be delivered to the various construction work areas using the
public roads as shown in Figure 12.4. The proposed delivery points from
the temporary Magazine are shown in Table 12.1.
12.4.3.9
According
to the current construction programme, delivery of explosives to the three
delivery points will be required from November 2011 to December 2012. The delivery programme to each
work area will overlap significantly.
12.4.3.10 In addition to cartridged
emulsion, cast boosters and detonating cord, detonators will also be
transported. Detonators will be transported in a separate and dedicated
licensed vehicle.
12.4.3.11 The licensed explosives delivery
vehicles (LGV pick-up trucks) for delivery of explosives from the temporary
site magazine to the worksites, used as the basis for this QRA, will have the
following safety features:
·
Diesel
powered;
·
Manual
fuel isolation switch;
·
Forward
mounted exhaust with spark arrestor;
·
All
electrical wiring or electrical devices will be shrouded in fire resisting
conduits;
·
Fuel
tank will be protected from accidental damage, and designed to prevent
accumulation of spilt fuel on any part of the vehicle;
·
Two
fire extinguishers will be mounted on an easily accessible position on the
vehicle;
·
Fire
resistant material will be fitted between the wheel arches and the goods
compartment;
·
Lockable
wood lined steel or aluminium receptacles mounted on the vehicle tray; and
·
Fold down / up explosives warning signs and rotating
flashing light.
12.4.3.12 In addition, a fire screen will be
fitted between the cab and the load compartment and between the load compartment
and the chassis.
12.4.4
Base Case and Worst Case for
Quantitative Risk Assessment
12.4.4.1
The
actual construction programme will depend on the detailed design and appointed
contractor. It may also depend on the actual achievable progress rates which may
vary due to specific site conditions (e.g. geology). To consider the
uncertainty in the envisaged construction programme, a Base Case, which
accounts for expected programme variations, and a Worst Case, which presents
the worst programme scenario, have been considered for the assessment.
12.4.5
Base Case programme for Hazard to
Life Assessment
12.4.5.1
Based
on the envisaged construction programme and sequence of works, the annual
travel distance by explosives vehicles, carrying cartridged emulsion and detonating
cord, will reach a peak in the period between November 2011 and October 2012, with an annual number of
deliveries of 1,232 and a travel distance of around 29,000 km. This period
is referred to as the peak explosives delivery period which is taken to
represent the Base Case scenario for the Hazard to Life Assessment. The
delivery frequency has been estimated on the basis that, for a given delivery
point, each delivery will be made to each blast face independently of the other
blast faces even if the load could be transported on the same truck. This
approach, although slightly conservative, accounts for expected delivery
variations during the peak delivery period, within which, separate deliveries
will be generally undertaken.
12.4.5.2
The
explosives load has been estimated on the basis that, for a particular delivery
point, when the blast time for various faces coincides in the construction
programme within the peak delivery period, explosives will be transported on the same
truck. The total
number of trips has been estimated based on the typical licensing limit of 200
kg explosives per truck.
12.4.5.3
In
the Base Case, it was considered that blasting could be carried out at
predetermined times during the day following the envisaged construction
programme. A distribution of delivery times has thus been considered based on
the construction programme.
12.4.5.4
The
Base Case programme is summarized in Table 12.2.
Table 12.2: Summary of
Explosives Deliveries and Transport Quantities (for Base Case)
|
Delivery Point |
Explosive Deliveries in Peak Delivery Period
(trips/year) |
Peak Transport Quantity (kg/trip) |
|
Ho Man Tin Station |
238 |
200 |
|
FKS Shaft |
413 |
119 |
|
CDR Shaft |
581 |
200 |
12.4.6
Worst Case programme for Hazard to
Life Assessment
12.4.6.1
The
Hazard to Life Assessment also covers the Worst Case scenario. It addresses the
possibility that, due to construction uncertainties or contractors’ methods of
working, the contractor proposes an actual construction programme which differs
from the envisaged construction programme. Such a case may result in a higher
number of delivery trips. Return trips loaded with explosives will generally be
avoided; however, due to some construction uncertainties, a number of return
trips could be made. Overall, in the worst case, a 20% increase in the number
of deliveries compared to the base case scenario may result based on previous
project experience.
12.4.6.2
In
this project, for a particular delivery point, it is possible that the
explosives load required for each delivery will be higher than that indicated in
the envisaged programme due to particular site conditions and blasting
requirements; however, the explosives load to be transported will be, as a
worst case, the maximum explosives load for the site (sum of the loads for each
blast face within the same work site). The delivery load, in the Worst Case
Scenario, has been selected as the sum of the loads for each blast face within
the same work site bearing in mind the licensing limit of 200 kg for the truck.
12.4.6.3
In
this Worst Case Scenario, explosives could be delivered at peak day times.
12.4.6.4
The
Worst Case programme is summarized in Table 12.3.
Table 12.3: Summary of
Explosives Deliveries and Transport Quantities (for Worst Case)
|
Delivery Point |
Explosive Deliveries in Peak Delivery Period
(trips/year) |
Peak Transport Quantity (kg/trip) |
|
Ho Man Tin Station |
286 |
200 |
|
FKS Shaft |
496 |
200 |
|
CDR Shaft |
697 |
200 |
12.5.1.1
Population
within the vicinity of the temporary explosives magazine is estimated based on
site surveys and information gathered from Geographic Information System (GIS)
database 2008 data (ref. 10) and aerial maps. The site is a relatively remote
location surrounded by woodland and is currently unoccupied.
12.5.1.2
Population
data used for the transport risk assessment have been collected by a
combination of site survey, Base District Traffic Model (BDTM) 2011, Annual Traffic
Census 2007 (ref. 11), Road Traffic Accident Statistics 2007 (ref. 12 &
13), Centamap (2009) and GIS tools. For areas where information is not
available, assumptions have been used consistently with the previously approved
studies. Three types of population have been considered.
·
Pedestrian
population on footpaths and pavements next to delivery routes;
·
Road
population; and
·
Building population.
12.5.1.3
The
approach to modelling the risks during the transport of explosives is fully
3-dimensional and GIS based. It also accounts for the potential increased risk
when explosives trucks travel on elevated roads.
12.5.1.4
The
population data adopted in the QRA is detailed in Appendix 12.1.
12.6.1 Background
12.6.1.1 Hazard identification consisted of a review of the following:
·
Explosives
properties;
·
Scenarios
presented in previous relevant studies;
·
Historical
accidents; and
·
Discussions with explosives and blasting specialists.
12.6.2
Hazards of Explosives
12.6.2.1
Explosives
present a hazard to both property and people. This hazard manifests itself in
the following ways:
·
Blast
and pressure wave;
·
Flying
fragments or missiles;
·
Thermal
radiation; and
·
Cratering and Ground shock.
12.6.2.2
In
the case of explosions, the biggest damage is usually caused by the blast
effects. The blast and pressure waves can cause injury to sensitive human
organs such as the ears and lungs. However, considerable overpressures are
required for fatalities to occur, and consequently people need to be fairly
close to the scene for the direct explosion effects to b significant.
12.6.2.3
Other
effects due to the blast or overpressure are associated with damage to
buildings and other structures/ objects or the impact of debris and fragments
from the damaged building structure, and the vehicle or container in which the
explosives are held. Moreover, injury may occur when people are displaced or
swept away, or due to the violent movement of internal organs within the body.
12.6.2.4
An
explosion may result in the formation of a short duration fireball since the
fuel content of the emulsion is oxidised. However, it is generally the case
that the thermal hazards from an explosives detonation event are of less
concern than the blast and fragment hazards.
12.6.3
Review of Incidents
12.6.3.1
A
review of reported safety incidents involving storage, transport and disposal
of explosives (in industrial applications) was carried out. Records were
retrieved mainly from the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE)’s Explosives
Incidents Database Advisory Service (EIDAS) (ref. 14), US Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MHSA) (ref. 15) and Western Australia’s Department of
Consumer and Employment Protection (DOCEP) (ref. 16). The records provided are
also supplemented with information obtained from various sources. An analysis
of accident data is provided in Section 5 and Section 6 of Appendix 12.1.
12.6.4
Scenarios for Hazard Assessment
12.6.4.1
The
following table (Table 12.4) provides a summary of the scenarios
considered in this QRA.
Table 12.4: Scenarios
Considered in the QRA Study
|
Tag |
Scenario |
|
Storage of
Explosives |
|
|
01 |
Detonation of
full load of explosives in 1 store in TKO Area 137 |
|
02 |
Detonation
of full load of explosives in one contractor truck on the access road within
TKO Area 137 magazine site boundary |
|
Transport of
Explosives |
|
|
03 |
Detonation of
full load of explosives in one contractor truck on public roads from TKO Area 137 site to Ho Man Tin delivery point |
|
04 |
Detonation
of full load of explosives in one contractor truck on public roads from TKO Area 137 site to |
|
05 |
Detonation
of full load of explosives in one contractor truck on public roads– from TKO Area 137 site to Club De Recreio delivery point |
12.7
Frequency
Analysis
12.7.1
Background
12.7.1.1
Deflagration
or detonation explosion may occur during the transportation of explosives from
the temporary magazine to the construction sites. This accidental explosion can
be caused by spontaneous fire (non-crash fire), fire after a vehicle crash
(crash fire), impact initiation in crash (crash impact) or spontaneous
explosion during the normal condition of transport which may occur if the cargo
load contains ‘unsafe explosives’.
12.7.1.2
In
this study, a fault tree has been developed to assess the overall explosion frequency
as applicable to the Project contractors’ trucks based on the latest
information available on the explosives properties, vehicle incident
frequencies provided by the Transport Department and Fire Services Department,
and the specific explosives transport vehicle design and operation to be used
as part of the Project. This is consistent with the previous XRL study
(ref. 2)). The
details of the frequency assessment are provided in Section 6 of Appendix 12.1.
12.7.2
Frequency
Analysis for Transport of Explosives
12.7.2.1
Based on
12.7.3
Frequency
Analysis for Storage of Explosives
12.7.3.1
The overall initiating
event frequency within the temporary storage magazine is based
upon the UK HSE recommended value of 1 x 10-4 per storehouse year. Additional
risk due to manual transfer of explosives, lightning strike, aircraft crash,
hill/ vegetation fire, earthquake and other site specific considerations to the
KTE project were also considered but their contribution was negligible (see
Section 6 of Appendix 12.1).
12.8.1.1
The probability of fatality due to blast over-pressure, have been
estimated using the method detailed by the UK HSE Explosives Storage and Transport
Committee (ref. 3). The fatality contours are calculated at 90%, 50%, 10%, 3%
and 1% fatality. Details of the model and the results are given in Section 7 of
Appendix 12.1.
12.8.1.2
Special features such as
slopes and service reservoirs along the transport routes or near the temporary magazine site were identified with respect to the potential secondary
hazards. These aspects of risk were evaluated separately, and were found either
insignificant or already covered by applying the blast overpressure-fatality
model (i.e. ESTC model (ref. 3)).
12.9
Risk Summation
12.9.1
Individual Risk Results
12.9.2
The individual risk
(IR) contours associated with the Project are shown in Figure 12.5 and Figure 12.6. In Figure 12.6 the ‘indoor’ refers
to the population located inside buildings, and the ‘outdoor’ refers to the
population located outside buildings i.e. in open areas. At the same distance
from a potential explosion, persons located inside buildings are more
vulnerable to explosion than persons located outside buildings as they are
exposed to more hazards such as debris from broken windows, etc. This explains
a higher individual risk for indoor population.
12.9.3
For the delivery
routes, the IR data represent the highest individual risk, occurring on the
road in the same lane as the explosives delivery truck. It is observed that the
maximum IR is about
8.2´10-8 per year. This is a low risk when compared to Hong Kong Risk Guidelines
which require the offsite IR from a fixed installation to be below 10-5
per year.
12.9.4
The temporary magazine site is in a remote area and the 10-5
per year contour does not extend offsite in both indoor/outdoor cases. There is
no continuous presence of people nearby. The presence of people in these areas will
be rare and only temporary leading to a very small presence factor. The
most exposed population group will be Mines Delivery personnel who will be
making/ receiving deliveries at the jetty. Such persons are not expected to be
present more than 8% of the time. Therefore, no member of the public will be exposed to an
IR of 10-5 per year. The actual risk to any individual will be much
smaller than 10-5 per year and is deemed to be acceptable.
12.9.5
Societal Risk Results
12.9.6
The societal risk results for explosives storage and transport for the KTE
project have been
combined to produce the overall societal risk results for the base case and the
worst case (Figure 12.7).
12.9.7
The Base Case represents the risks associated with the envisaged
blasting programme. It can be seen that the risks lie in the ALARP region.
12.9.8
The Worst Case represents the maximum risks associated with the worst blasting
scenario. The risks, as expected, are higher than the base case but still
within the ALARP region.
12.9.9
Figure 12.8 shows the F-N curve for the Base
Case with a breakdown by storage and transport. It is observed that risks from
the temporary magazine are negligible compared to the transport risks. Indeed,
the temporary magazine is located in a remote area with very low population
density nearby.
12.9.10
The F-N curves for both base case and worst case are within the As Low as
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) Region as per HK EIAO-TM. Therefore, mitigation
measures need to be considered to reduce the risk. The ALARP assessment is
provided in Section 9 of Appendix 12.1.
12.9.11
The Potential Loss of Life (PLL) for the base case and the worst case
are given in Table 12.5 and Table 12.6 respectively. The PLL for this Project has been evaluated at 5.66 x 10-4 per year. The
maximum PLL value for the Project is estimated at 7.91 x 10-4 per year, which
is obtained from the worst case.
Table 12.5: Potential Loss
of Life for Base Case
|
Base Case |
PLL (per year) |
Percentage Contribution (%) |
|
Storage of
Explosives |
||
|
TKO Area
137 Magazine |
9.17E-07 |
0.16% |
|
Transport of
Explosives |
||
|
Detonation of full load of explosives in one
contractor truck on public roads from TKO Area 137 site to Ho Man Tin
delivery point |
9.55E-05 |
16.9% |
|
Detonation of full load of explosives in one
contractor truck on public roads from TKO Area 137 site to |
1.46E-04 |
25.8% |
|
Detonation of full load of explosives in one
contractor truck on public – from TKO Area 137 site to Club De Recreio
delivery point |
3.24E-04 |
57.2% |
|
Total |
5.66E-04 |
|
Table 12.6: Potential Loss
of Life for Worst Case
|
Worst Case |
PLL (per year) |
Percentage Contribution (%) |
|
Storage of
Explosives |
||
|
TKO Area
137 Magazine |
9.17E-07 |
0.12% |
|
Transport of
Explosives |
||
|
Detonation of full load of explosives in one
contractor truck on public roads from TKO Area 137 site to Ho Man Tin
delivery point |
1.25E-04 |
15.9% |
|
Detonation of full load of explosives in one
contractor truck on public roads from TKO Area 137 site to |
2.53E-04 |
32.0% |
|
Detonation of full load of explosives in one
contractor truck on public – from TKO Area 137 site to Club De Recreio
delivery point |
4.12E-04 |
52.1% |
|
Total |
7.91E-04 |
|
12.9.12
ALARP Assessment
12.9.13
Since the risks posed by the Project, for both cases considered, are within the ALARP region
specified in EIAO-TM Annex 4, this implies that risk reduction measures and /
or alternate options should be explored for the Project.
12.9.14
It was found that the risks arising from explosives transport are much
more significant than that of the explosives storage; hence the ALARP
assessment focuses on the transportation aspects of explosives.
12.9.15
Where the risk falls into the ALARP region, the risks associated with
each probable hazardous event should be reduced to a level ‘as low as
reasonably practicable’. This firstly requires the identification of any
‘practicable’ options regardless of their cost. A mitigation option is
considered ‘practicable’ if an engineering solution exists and can be
implemented on the KTE project regardless of the cost without affecting the
project construction programme. Secondly, the extent to which the risk should
be reduced is usually measured as a trade off between the risk reduction, i.e.
the safety benefits and the cost of the risk reduction measure. A mitigation
option is considered ‘reasonable’ if the cost of implementing the option is not
grossly disproportionate to the achieved safety benefits.
12.9.16
Risk mitigation measures may take the form of engineered measures,
controls in the zones most impacted by the hazardous scenarios presented by
this project, or operation and procedural controls
Approach
to ALARP Assessment
12.9.17
The approach consists of identifying potential justifiable mitigation
measures, assessing their practicability for this Project and evaluating their cost
and comparing with the safety benefits of implementing the measures.
Combinations of mitigation measures are also considered.
12.9.18
The safety benefits are evaluated as follows:
Safety Benefits = Value of
Preventing a Fatality x Aversion Factor x Reduction in PLL value x Design life
of mitigation measure.
12.9.19
The Value of Preventing a Fatality (VPF) reflects the tolerability of
risk by the society and therefore the monetary value that the society is ready
to invest to prevent a fatality. For the purpose of this assessment and for
consistency with previous studies, the Value of Preventing a Fatality is taken
as HK$33M per person, which is the same figure as used in previous Hazard
Assessment studies (derived from ref. 17 but updated to current prices).
12.9.20
Depending on the level of risk, the value of preventing a fatality may
be adjusted to reflect people’s aversion to high risks or scenarios with
potential for multiple fatalities. The methodology for application of the
‘aversion factor’ follows that developed by EPD (ref. 18), in which the
aversion factor is calculated on a sliding scale from 1 (risks at the lower
boundary of the ALARP region of the Risk Guidelines) up to a maximum of 20
(risks at the upper boundary of the ALARP region). The adjusted VPF using the
aversion factor of 20 is HK$660M. This value is a measure of how much the
society is willing to invest to prevent a fatality, where there is potential
for an event to cause multiple fatalities.
12.9.21
With reference to Appendix 12,
the maximum justifiable expenditure for this Project is calculated as HK$ 0.61M assuming the design life of the
mitigation measure is 1.17 years based on the construction phase of the KTE project during which
storage and transport
of explosives will be involved, with the PLL of 7.91 x 10-4 per year, which is
obtained from the Worst Case.
12.9.22
For an ‘achievable’ mitigation measure to be potentially justifiable,
its cost should be less than the Maximum Justifiable Expenditure.
Potential
Justifiable Mitigation Measures
12.9.23
The potential options that have been examined in the ALARP assessment
include the following categories.
·
Options eliminating the need for a temporary Magazine or eliminating the
risk (e.g. Use of alternative methods of construction (‘hard rock’ TBMs));
·
Options
reducing
significantly the distance run by contractors’ explosive trucks such as closer temporary magazine
sites and alternative routes. The temporary magazine and route options
considered are summarised below:
-
A list of 24 alternative
temporary
magazine sites to TKO Area 137 were considered. (Appendix 12).
However, none of the alternative candidate
sites could meet the Commissioner of Mines’ external separation requirements.
Therefore, no alternative temporary magazine site option has been considered for the ALARP
assessment.
-
Based on a review of the possible transport routes for this project,
The possibility of using
-
The combined Road/Marine transport option from the temporary magazine
site to the KTE construction sites was not considered practicable.
·
Options
reducing significantly the quantities of explosives to be used such as use of
‘hard rock’ TBM or alternatives to cartridged emulsion.
-
It is possible to use smaller explosive charges for
initiating explosives such as ‘cast boosters’. The main explosive component of ‘cast
boosters’ is PETN. Using such explosives will reduce the weight of explosives
to be transported. However, PETN has a higher TNT equivalency. This will also
not eliminate the need for detonating cord. This option has been selected for
further cost benefit evaluation.
·
Options
considering improved explosives truck design; and
·
Options
considering better risk management systems and procedures.
12.9.24
In summary, the
following options have been considered for cost-benefit analysis.
·
Option
1: Use of
·
Option
2: Use of Smaller Quantities of Explosives.
12.9.25
The PLL for Options
1 and 2 is compared to the PLL
for the Worst Case in Table 12.7. This was used as the basis
for the cost-benefit analysis/ ALARP assessment presented in Table 12.8.
12.9.26
Other options
considered practicable have been either recommended for implementation or
assessed comparing the implementation cost with the maximum justifiable expenditure.
The evaluation for each option is shown in Table
12.8. More details are available in Section
9 of Appendix 12.
Table 12.7: Potential Loss
of Life for Worst Case, Option 1 and Option 2
|
Case |
PLL (per year) |
|
Worst Case |
7.91E-04 |
|
Option 1: Use of |
8.94E-04 |
|
Option 2: Use of Smaller Quantities of Explosives |
5.37E-04 |
Table 12.8: ALARP
Assessment Results
|
Option
Description |
Practicability |
Implementation
Cost |
Safety
Benefits or Justifiable Expenditure |
ALARP
Assessment Result |
|
Use of alternative
methods of construction (TBMs) |
Not
Practicable |
>
HK$ 100M |
HK$
0.61M |
Not
Justified |
|
Use of Magazines
Closer to the Construction Sites |
Not Practicable |
- |
|
Closest
practicable magazine site to the construction sites has been selected |
|
Use of different
explosive types (different types of detonating cord) |
Pose
some limitations |
HK$ 1M |
No
safety benefit |
Not
Justified |
|
Alternative Route
(Option Case 1) |
Practicable
for Road Transport. Not
practicable for the combined Road/Marine Transport Option. |
- |
Negative |
|
|
Use of Smaller Quantities
of Explosives (Option Case 2) |
Practicable |
>
HK$ 0.50M |
HK$
0.20M |
Use
of cast boosters is not justifiable on risk grounds. The cast booster option will be explored further
in line with the use of best practice in explosives selection. [1] |
|
Safer explosive truck
(reduced fire load) |
Practicable |
- |
- |
Based
on low implementation costs, this option has been directly incorporated in
recommendations |
|
Reduction of Accident
Involvement Frequency (training programme etc.) |
Practicable |
- |
- |
Based
on low implementation costs, this option has been directly incorporated in
recommendations |
|
Reduction of Fire
Involvement Frequency (better emergency response, extinguisher types etc.) |
Practicable |
- |
- |
Based
on low implementation costs, this option has been directly incorporated in
recommendations |
Note: [1] Please refer to Hazard to Life
Assessment Final Draft Report, Section 9.6.3, paragraph 5 at page A12-146
12.10
Cumulative Risk Assessment
12.10.1.1 Cumulative risk assessment analyses the combined risks of
fatality arising from exposure to hazards due to storage and transport of
dangerous goods in various projects being undertaken concurrently.
12.10.1.2
The
projects that interface with the KTE Project are: the
Shatin to Central Link (SCL) Tai Wai to Hung Hom Section (SCL-EWL), the
SCL Cross Harbour Section (SCL-NSL), the Central Kowloon Route (CKR) and the
widening of the Gascoigne Road Flyover. The projects are either not geographically
aligned with the KTE placement (alignment, worksites, magazine site or
transport routes) or not chronologically aligned with the blasting programme.
Not only is the CKR Project use of explosives planned for the period from
Oct 2013 to April 2015, a
non-blasting zone is already proposed within the CKR blasting design to avoid
impact on both KTE and SCL-EWL.
12.10.1.3
Therefore, there is
no cumulative risk to be considered according to the current blasting
programmes.
12.10.1.4
In a worst case scenario the tunnel alignment may encounter potential faults and zones of local
soft ground requiring particular construction methods resulting in a slower
advance rate possibly prolonging the KTE tunnel blasting programme leading to a
potential overlap with the SCL-EWL blasting programme. The maximum cumulative
societal risk for a full overlap of the peak year of KTE and peak year of
SCL-EWL along the common transport route remains within the ALARP region (as
shown in Figure 12.11), and the presented
conclusions would still apply. In this worst case the maximum individual risk
(IR) for the adjacent magazine sites in TKO Area 137 and the common route has
been aggregated. The pier in TKO Area 137 is used for delivery of explosives
for other projects however the transport of explosives by Mines Division is out
of scope of this assessment, and only the transport of explosives by the
appointed contractors of MTR as part of the KTE and SCL-EWL Projects is
considered in the cumulative risk assessment.
12.10.1.5 As can be seen from Figures 12.9 and 12.10, in a worst case scenario the cumulative individual risk is
less than <1E-05, and therefore acceptable according to the risk criterion.
12.10.1.6 As can be seen the risk from the combined
projects remains within the ALARP region. ALARP assessment has been described
for the KTE project in Appendix 12. Similar ALARP assessment is included for
the SCL-EWL project for the storage and transport of explosives. Combined ALARP
assessment also results in the same conclusion as the individual ALARP
assessment.
12.11.1.1 A QRA has been carried out to
assess the hazard to life issues arising from the storage and transport of explosives during
the construction of the KTE Project.
12.11.1.2 The criterion of Annex 4 of the
EIAO-TM for Individual Risk is met with regards to the hazards to life posed by
the storage and transport of explosives. The assessment results show that the societal risk lies
within the ALARP region when compared to the criteria stipulated in the
EIAO-TM. A detailed ALARP assessment has been undertaken considering a wide
range of mitigation measures and the results show compliance with the ALARP
principles provided that the following recommendations are followed.
12.12.1
Specific Recommendations
12.12.1.1 Following the ALARP principles, the following recommendations are justified and should be implemented to meet the EIAO-TM requirements:
·
The
truck design should be improved to reduce the amount of combustibles in the cabin.
The fuel carried in the fuel tank should also be minimised to reduce the
duration of any fire;
·
The
explosive truck accident frequency should be minimized by implementing a
dedicated training programme for both the driver and his attendants, including
regular briefing sessions, implementation of a defensive driving attitude. In
addition, drivers should be selected based on good safety record, and medical
checks;
·
The
contractor should as far as practicable combine the explosives deliveries for a
given work area;
·
Only
the required quantity of explosives for a particular blast should be
transported to avoid the return of unused explosives to the magazines.
·
Whenever
practicable, a minimum headway between two consecutive truck convoys of 10 min
is recommended; and
·
The
explosives truck fire involvement frequency should be minimized by implementing
a better emergency response and training to make sure the adequate fire
extinguishers are used and attempt is made to evacuate the area of the incident
or securing the explosive load if possible. All explosive vehicles should also
be equipped with bigger capacity AFFF-type extinguishers.
12.12.2 General Recommendations
12.12.1
Blasting
activities including storage and transport of explosives should be supervised and
audited by competent site staff to ensure strict compliance with the blasting
permit conditions. The following general recommendation should also be
considered for the storage and transport of explosives:
·
The
security plan should address different alert security level to reduce
opportunity for arson / deliberate initiation of explosives. The corresponding
security procedure should be implemented with respect to prevailing security
alert status announced by the Government;
·
Emergency
plan (i.e. magazine operational manual) shall be developed to address
uncontrolled fire in magazine area and transport. The case of fire near an
explosives carrying truck in jammed traffic should also be covered. Drill of
the emergency plan should be carried out at regular intervals;
·
Adverse
weather working guideline should be developed to clearly define procedure for
transport explosives during thunderstorm; and
·
The
magazine storage quantities need to be reported on a monthly basis to ensure
that the two day storage capacity is not exceeded.
12.12.3 Storage of Explosives in Magazine Store
12.12.3.1 The magazine should be designed, operated and maintained in accordance with Mines Division guidelines and appropriate industry best practice. In addition, the following recommendations should be implemented:
·
A
suitable work control system should be introduced, such as an operational
manual including Permit-to-Work system, to ensure that work activities undertaken
during the operation of the magazine are properly controlled;
·
There
should be good house-keeping within the magazine to ensure that combustible
materials are not allowed to accumulate;
·
The
magazine shall be without open drains, traps, pits or pockets into which any
molten ammonium nitrate could flow and be confined in the event of a fire;
·
The
magazine building shall be regularly checked for water seepage through the
roof, walls or floor;
·
Caked
explosives shall be disposed of in an appropriate manner;
·
Delivery
vehicles shall not be permitted to remain within the secured fenced off
magazine store area;
·
Good
housekeeping outside the magazine stores to be followed to ensure combustibles
(including vegetation) are removed;
·
A
speed limit within the magazine area should be enforced to reduce the risk of a
vehicle impact or incident within the magazine area;
·
Traffic
Management should be implemented within the magazine site, to ensure that no more
than 1 vehicle will be loaded at any time, in order to avoid accidents
involving multiple vehicles within the site boundary. Based on the construction
programme, considering that 6 trucks could be loaded over a peak 2 hour period,
this is considered feasible; and
· The design of the fill slope close to the magazine site should consider potential washout failures and incorporate engineering measures to prevent a washout causing damage to the magazine stores.
12.12.4 Transport of Explosives
General
Recommendations
12.12.4.1
The
following measures should be considered for safe transport of explosives:
·
Detonators
shall not be transported in the same vehicle with other Class 1 explosives.
Separation of vehicles should be maintained during the whole trip;
·
Location
for stopping and unloading from truck to be provided as close as possible to
shaft, free from dropped loads, hot work, etc. during time of unloading;
·
Develop
procedure to ensure that parking space on the site is available for the
explosives truck. Confirmation of parking space should be communicated to truck
drivers before delivery. If parking space on site cannot be secure, delivery
should not commence;
·
During
transport of the explosives within the tunnel, hot work or other activities
should not be permitted in the vicinity of the explosives offloading or
charging activities;
·
Ensure
lining is provided within the transportation box on the vehicle and in good
condition before transportation;
·
Ensure
that packaging of detonators remains intact until handed over at blasting site;
·
Emergency
plan to include activation of fuel and battery isolation switches on vehicle
when fire breaks out to prevent fire spreading and reducing likelihood of
prolonged fire leading to explosion;
·
Use
only experienced driver(s) with good safety record; and
·
Ensure
that cartridged emulsion packages are damage free before every trip.
Contractors
Licensed Vehicle Recommended Safety Requirements
12.12.4.2
The
following measures are recommended:
·
·
Front
mounted exhaust with spark arrestor;
·
Fuel
level should be kept as far as possible to the minimum level required for the
transport of explosives;
·
Minimum
1 x 9 kg water based AFFF fire extinguisher to be provided;
·
Minimum
1 x 9 kg dry chemical powder fire extinguisher to be provided;
·
Horizontal
fire screen on cargo deck and vertical fire screen mounted at least 150mm
behind the drivers cab and 100mm from the steel cargo compartment, the vertical
screen shall protrude 150mm in excess of all three (3) sides of the steel cargo
compartment;
·
Cigarette
lighter removed;
·
Two
(2) battery powered torches for night deliveries;
·
Vehicles
shall be brand new, dedicated explosives transport vehicles and should be
maintained in good operating condition;
·
Daily
checks on tyres and vehicle integrity;
·
Regular
monthly vehicle inspections;
-
Fuel system;
-
Exhaust system;
-
Brakes;
-
Electrics;
-
-
Cooling system; and
-
Engine oil leaks.
·
Vehicle
log book in which monthly inspections and maintenance requirements are
recorded; and
·
Mobile
telephone equipped.
Recommended
Requirements for the Driver of the Explosives Vehicle:
12.12.4.3
The
driver shall:
·
be
registered by the Commissioner of Mines and must be over the age of 25 years with
proven accident free records and more than 7 year driving experience without
suspension.
·
hold
a Driving License for the class of vehicle for at least one (1) year;
·
adopt
a safe driving practice including having attended a defensive driving course;
·
pass
a medical check and is assessed as fit to drive explosives vehicles; and
·
not
be dependent on banned substances.
12.12.4.4
Some
of the following requirements may also apply to the vehicle attendant(s).
·
The
driver is required to attend relevant training courses recognized by the
Commissioner of Mines. The training courses should include the following major
subjects, but not limited to:
-
the laws and Regulations
relating to the transport of explosives; and
-
security and safe
handling during the transport of explosives.
·
Attend
training courses provided by the explosives manufacturer or distributor,
covering the following:
-
explosives
identification;
-
explosion hazards; and
-
explosives sensitivity;
-
the dangers which could
be caused by the types of explosives;
-
the packaging, labelling
and characteristics of the types of explosives;
-
the use of fire
extinguishers and fire fighting procedures; and
-
emergency response
procedures in case of accidents.
12.12.4.5
The
driver should additionally be responsible for the following:
·
The
driver shall have a full set of Material Safety Data Sheets ( MSDS ) for each
individual explosive aboard the vehicle for the particular journey;
·
The
MSDS and Removal Permit ( where applicable ) shall be produced to any officer
of the Mines Division of CEDD upon request;
·
A
card detailing emergency procedures shall be kept on board and displayed in a
prominent place on the drivers door;
·
Before
leaving the magazine the driver together with and/or assisted by the shotfirer
shall check the following:
-
Packaging integrity and
labelling;
-
Check that the types and
quantities of explosives loaded onto the vehicle are as stipulated in the
Removal Permit(s);
-
Check that the explosive
load does not exceed the quantities stated in the removal permit;
-
Check the condition and
integrity of the cargo compartment or box;
-
Check that detonators
are not loaded in the explosives cargo compartment and vice versa;
-
Check that the cargo is
secured and cannot be damaged during the delivery;
-
Ensure that the
appropriate placards and a red flag are displayed before leaving the magazine;
-
Be competent to operate
all equipment onboard the vehicle including fire extinguishers and the vehicle
emergency cut-off switches;
-
Prohibit smoking when
the vehicle is loaded with explosives;
-
When explosives are
loaded, ensure the vehicle is not left unattended;
-
Be conversant with
emergency response procedures.
Specific
Recommended Requirements for the Explosives Vehicle Attendants:
·
When
the vehicle is loaded with explosives, it shall be attended by the driver and
at least one (1) other person authorized by the Commissioner of Mines. The
vehicle attendant shall:
-
Be the assistant to the
driver in normal working conditions and in case of any emergency;
-
Be conversant with the
emergency response procedures; and
-
Be competent to use the
fire extinguishers and the vehicle emergency cut-off switches.
·
One
of the vehicle attendant(s) should be equipped with mobile phones and the
relevant MSDS and emergency response plan.
12.12.5 Type of Explosives & their Disposal
12.12.5.1
For
explosives selection, the following should be considered
·
Cartridged
Emulsions with perchlorate formulation should be avoided; and
·
Cartridged
Emulsions with high water content should be preferred.
12.12.5.2 If disposal is required for small
quantities, disposal should be made in a controlled and safe manner by a
Registered Shotfirer.
[1] MTR, Consultancy Agreement No. NEX/2203,
Kwun Tong Line Extension Preliminary Design, “Deliverable 3.25 – Final Preliminary Design Report”, April 2009. (MTR 1)
[2] ERM, Express Rail Link: Hazard to Life Assessment
for the Transport and Storage of Explosives, 2009 (ESB-197/2008) (ERM, 2009)
[3] HSC, Selection and Use of Explosion
Effects and Consequence Models for Explosives, Advisory Committee on Dangerous
Substances, 2000 (ESTC, 2000)
[4] ERM,
[5] DNV, The Risk Assessment of the
Transport of Explosives in Hong Kong QRA Report, Environmental Protection
Department Hong Kong Government, 1997, EPD CE63/94 (DNV, 1997)
[6] United Nations, Recommendations on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods – Manual of Tests and Criteria, 4th Revised
Edition, 2003 (TDG-Test Manual, 2003)
[7] United Nations, Recommendations on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods – Model Regulations, 15th Revised Edition, 2007
(TDG-Model Regulation, 2007)
[8] CEDD, Guidance Note on Requirements for
Approval of an Explosives Delivery Vehicle,
http://www.cedd.gov.hk/eng/services/mines_quarries/doc/gn_03_edv.pdf (CEDD 2)
[9] CEDD, How to apply for a Mode A
Explosives Store Licence,
http://www.cedd.gov.hk/eng/services/mines_quarries/doc/mode_a_store.pdf (CEDD
3)
[10] Lands Department, Geographic Information
System (GIS) database, http://www.landsd.gov.hk/mapping/en/digital_map/mapprod.htm
The latest information on the GIS map of buildings from the Lands Department
used in this study comes from 2008 (LD, 2008)
[11] Transport Department, Annual Traffic
Census 2007 (ATC, 2007)
[12] Transport Department, "Road Traffic
Accident Statistics”, Government of Hong Kong S.A.R, 2007 (and previous years)
(TD, 2007a)
[13] Transport Department, Road Traffic
Accidents at Junction by Junction Type, Junction Control and Severity 2007,
http://www.td.gov.hk/FileManager/EN/Content_1943/07fig2.12e.pdf (TD, 2007b)
[14] UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE)’s
Explosives Incidents Database Advisory Service (EIDAS)
[15] Incident database retrieved from US Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MHSA)
[16] DOCEP, Incident Log Reports retrieved from
http://www.docep.wa.gov.au/resourcesSafety/Content/Dangerous_Goods/Incident_log_reports/index.htm
(DOCEP)
[17] ACDS, Risk from Handling Explosives in
Ports, HSC Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances,
[18] EPD, Technical Note: Cost Benefit Analysis
in Hazard Assessment, Environmental Protection Department, Rev. January 1996.
(EPD, 1996)
[19] MTR, Consultancy Agreement No. NEX/2203,
Kwun Tong Line Extension Preliminary Design, “Deliverable 3.7 – Final Blast
Risk Report”, March 2009. (MTR 2)
[20] MTR, Consultancy Agreement No. NEX/2203,
Kwun Tong Line Extension Preliminary Design, “Working Paper 18 – Ho Man Tin
Station Open Cut Scheme”, April 2009. (MTR 3)
[21] MTR, Consultancy Agreement No. NEX/2203, Kwun
Tong Line Extension Preliminary Design, “Shatin to Central Link (East West
Link) and Kwun Tong Line Extension – Location Study for Explosives Magazine”,
19 April 2010. (MTR 4)