2.1.1.1
The
purpose of this section is to provide information on the need for the project
and to describe scenarios with and without the project. This section has been
structured as follows:
Section
2.2 – Background presents the historical setting for the project, including a review of
the airport planning and development process which led to the existing Hong Kong
International Airport (HKIA) and its current
operations.
Section
2.3 - Constraints of the Existing HKIA to Meet Future Traffic Demand, explains why the third runway
project is needed and why it is considered that there is no other viable
alternative to meet the future demands on HKIA.
Section
2.4 – The Benefits of the Project describes the scenarios with the project,
and the benefits associated with a three-runway system (3RS) at HKIA.
Section
2.5 – Consequences of Not Proceeding with the Project describes scenarios without the
project and the consequences associated with restriction of HKIA as a
two-runway system (2RS).
Section
2.6 – Summary
provides a brief review of the key points raised in this section.
Section
2.7 – References lists all the reference documents which have been referred to in this
section.
2.2 Background
2.2.1.1
There
are extensive planning studies documenting the historical development of the
airport. To appreciate the long-term and continuous airport planning and
development process in Hong Kong, the following sub-sections provide an
overview of the airport development history leading up to commissioning of the
current HKIA at North Lantau.
Overview of Kai Tak Airport (1925 to
1998)
2.2.1.2
Hong
Kong has had an international airport for over 70 years. The first airport, Kai
Tak Airport, was located along the eastern waterfront of the densely urbanised
Kowloon City District. The airport’s facilities were progressively expanded
throughout the years to handle up to 24 million passengers and 1.5 million
tonnes of cargo annually. However, by 1996 the airport had far exceeded its
annual design capacity and was handling 29.5 million passengers1 and 1.56 million tonnes of freight, making it the third
busiest airport in the world in terms of international passenger traffic and
the busiest in terms of international cargo throughput [1] at that time.
1 This number
excludes transit passengers
Early Studies on Airport and Development
Needs in the 1970s and 1980s
2.2.1.3
As
early as the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the need for
replacing Kai Tak Airport was identified and debated. Key reasons cited for the
airport replacement included [2]:
¡ Kai Tak
Airport was approaching its maximum capacity. The capacity of Kai Tak Airport was ultimately constrained by its single-runway system;
¡ The location of the airport affected approximately 350,000 people
living under the flight paths (and who were subject to aircraft noise levels
exceeding internationally accepted standards);
¡ The location imposed physical constraints to aircraft arrivals /
departures and created less than ideal safety standards; and
¡ Continuation of Kai Tak Airport at full capacity would severely
limit local economic growth, which could result in Hong Kong losing out to neighbouring
competitors as the major centre for trade, finance and commerce.
2.2.1.4
Options
for the expansion of Kai Tak Airport were considered first; however due to
constraints associated with marine safety and reclamation further south of the
existing runway, these options were not considered viable. In view of the
Government’s priority to retain (and enhance) Hong Kong’s sea port and airport
facilities and given the lack of practical and cost-effective options to
enhance the capacity of the old single-runway airport, alternative sites for a
replacement airport were then considered.
2.2.1.5
A
number of studies were commissioned in 1970s and 1980s to review the overall
development of Hong Kong, including options for a replacement airport. A
chronological account of the major studies is as follows:
Hong Kong Air Transport System Long
Term Planning and Investigation Studies (ASTI) - 1973
2.2.1.6
As
part of this study, an initial list of 30 sites was considered with six
shortlisted, including Chek Lap Kok. Ultimately, the study concluded that the
Chek Lap Kok site was the preferred option [3].
Consultancy Report for the New
International Airport at Chek Lap Kok - 1980
2.2.1.7
This
study assessed the feasibility for a replacement airport at Chek Lap Kok [4]. The study concluded
that it was feasible to construct and operate an airport at Chek Lap Kok.
North Lantau Development
Investigations (NLDI) – 1980 to 1984
2.2.1.8
In
early 1980s, a series of investigation studies were conducted on the potential
development of North Lantau. These investigations were aimed at assessing the
potential of North Lantau in the context of overall long-term territorial
development [4].
Replacement Airport at Chek Lap Kok
Master Plan Consultancy Final Report - 1982
2.2.1.9
A
Chek Lap Kok airport master plan was produced as part of a full master plan
study in 1982, with associated planning, civil engineering, design,
environmental analysis and construction programming completed in 1983 [4]. However, due to
economic downturn, these projects were discontinued.
Port Development Strategy Study - 1986
2.2.1.10
This
study looked at the long-term port requirements in Hong Kong and provided
recommendations for port expansion to 2001 [4]. This led to
subsequent proposals for Western Harbour – Lantau Strategic Development
(WH-LSD), which included major expansion of deep water berth facilities in the
western harbour; a new airport either at Chek Lap Kok or in the vicinity of
Peng Chau – Hei Ling Chau, and associated large scale urban development areas [4].
Development Potential of Hong Kong
International Airport – The Kai Tak Consultancy - 1988
2.2.1.11
Following
increases in airport activity in the mid-1980s, this study re-examined the
demand, capacity and other constraints on development of Kai Tak Airport. The
study estimated that Kai Tak Airport’s ultimate capacity would be exhausted by
1996 and the programme of improvements required to reach the ultimate capacity
would cost in the order of HK$ 2.4
billion [4]. In the absence of a
replacement airport, economic losses between 1996 and 2010 were estimated at
HK$ 101 billion,
excluding other unquantifiable losses to business opportunities [4]. These findings
revived plans for the replacement of Kai Tak Airport.
Chek Lap Kok Airport Master Plan
Review Final Report - 1988
2.2.1.12
This
study reviewed the findings of the Replacement
Airport at Chek Lap Kok
Master Plan Consultancy study and reconfirmed the results.
Alternative Replacement Airport Site
Study (ARAS) - 1989
2.2.1.13
This
study examined suitable locations (in addition to the Chek Lap Kok site)
between Lantau and Lamma islands where a twin-runway replacement airport could
be developed. It identified the potentially suitable alternative sites, which
were subsequently taken up by the Port and Airport Development Strategy (PADS)
study for further comparison with the Chek Lap Kok site [2]. The PADS study
formed a crucial turning point that led to the decision by Government to
confirm and adopt the Chek Lap Kok site as the new site for a two-runway
airport.
Port and Airport Development Strategy
(PADS)
2.2.1.14
Following
on from the earlier studies, a long-term strategy on port and airport
development was required both to consolidate the findings of the previous
studies as well as to present a more holistic way forward. Thus in 1988, PADS
was commissioned.
2.2.1.15
The
PADS study comprised an assessment of the combined land uses of port
facilities, container port back-up facilities, airport, industry and
warehousing, and residential development. The strategy for these combined land
uses largely centred around the development scenarios for the airport.
Following the findings of the earlier studies, three airport location scenarios
were appraised:
Scenario A – airport retained at Kai Tak
Scenario B – airport relocated to Chek Lap Kok, North
Lantau
Scenario C – airport relocated to east Lantau / Western
Harbour (based on the findings of the ARAS study)
2.2.1.16
For
each of these scenarios, a number of potential initial options were created
based on various combinations of airport, port, industry and residential uses
and locations. A total of 46 initial options were drawn up and subsequently 12
preferred options were identified [4]. This was then
reduced to one recommended strategy for each airport location scenario.
2.2.1.17
Each
of the recommended strategies was appraised to compare the advantages and
disadvantages under the major categories of economic performance, environmental
and social impact, programming, flexibility and financial performance. The
findings of the strategies appraisal was submitted to the Government, and in 1989, the Government announced the decision to
adopt the strategy that incorporated a replacement airport at Chek Lap Kok [4].
North Lantau Development Study
2.2.1.18
The
proposed new airport at Chek
Lap Kok and its high capacity road and rail connections represented
requirements and pressure for urban development on Lantau. The North Lantau
Development study was commissioned in 1990 to provide an appropriate context
for the detailed planning, engineering feasibility, traffic and transport, as
well as environmental studies needed to implement PADS in the North Lantau
area. It involved formulating a Recommended Outline Development Plan (RODP) for
the study area and included a comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) study for the development [5]. The final report
was published in 1992.
New Airport Master Plan 1992
2.2.1.19
After
Chek Lap Kok was selected for development as the ‘new’ airport site, a New
Airport Master Plan (NAMP) study was initiated in 1990. This study comprised a planning report, a civil engineering
report and an EIA.
New Airport Master Plan EIA Study 1992
2.2.1.20
The
planning and civil engineering reports produced a range of conceptual
infrastructure and facility designs, proposed construction methodologies and
operational forecasts, which were used as the basis for the development of
detailed designs. The NAMP-EIA defined
how identified environmental impacts of building and operating HKIA could be
minimised, proposing
associated environmental controls, mitigation measures and monitoring and audit
requirements for construction and operation stages. The study focused on
identifying potential impacts on noise, air quality, water quality, marine and
terrestrial ecology, waste, and aesthetics (visual). Based on the findings of
the NAMP EIA, some of the key recommendations included [6]:
¡ Retain the sea channel between North Lantau and Chek Lap Kok to
enable natural flushing of the Tung Chung Bay area (thereby reducing adverse impacts
on water quality);
¡ Implement various control measures on pollutant
discharge from the operational airport including oil interception facilities,
spillage response plans and routine environmental monitoring;
¡ Select the runway configuration and alignments with less potential
for noise impacts on nearby noise sensitive receivers, and locate aircraft
maintenance facilities further away from the North Lantau residents and distant
from passenger handling areas;
¡ Set aside the southern tip of Chek Lap Kok (Scenic Hill) both to
reduce noise impacts to North Lantau residents during the construction stage
and then to retain its natural character by designating an open space reserve
to form a green gateway for HKIA;
¡ Adoption of airport operations designed to minimise freshwater use,
incorporating the use of seawater for cooling and flushing in many airport
buildings, as well as provisioning for a greywater treatment plant, which would
enable the re-use of wastewater;
¡ An approach requiring stormwater drainage from all areas with
potentially polluting activities to discharge away from the more sensitive
southern sea channel; and
¡ Recommendations on a range of mitigation and compensation measures
including tree-planting on North Lantau, mangrove planning in Tai O and support
of further ecological studies, for example on local seagrass communities and
species such as Romer’s Tree Frog.
2.2.1.21
While
the aforementioned recommendations were made in the NAMP EIA to minimise
environmental impacts associated with operation of the airport at the Chek Lap
Kok site, it should be noted that the decision to move the airport from Kai Tak
to Chek Lap Kok enabled a substantial reduction of adverse noise impacts to
large areas of urban Kowloon. This occurred because the
Chek Lap Kok location allowed flight paths to be routed mainly over the South
China Sea and away from urban areas, thereby substantially reducing the number
of sensitive receivers potentially affected by aircraft noise.
Airport Core Programme Projects
2.2.1.22
To
commence construction of the new airport and associated developments, a set of
10 major projects known as the Airport Core Programme projects was
commissioned. These comprised the Chek Lap Kok Airport, Tung Chung Development
Phase I, North Lantau Expressway, Airport Railway, Lantau Fixed Crossing, Route
3, West Kowloon Reclamation, West Kowloon Expressway, Western Harbour Crossing,
and Central & Wanchai Reclamation Phase I. Another set of projects related
to port developments was also adopted. Work on the infrastructure to that would
link with the new airport began in 1991 [7].
New Airport Master Plan Update 1998
2.2.1.23
In
1998, a NAMP-EIA update was published. The update reported on the status of
implementation of environmental commitments made in the 1992 NAMP-EIA relating
to the design, construction and operation of HKIA. The update also included the projection of
new noise contours according to a commitment in the 1991 NAMP-EIA. Changes from the 1992 contours resulted
mainly from alterations to the proposed runway operation modes that were made
after approval of the 1992 NAMP. The new noise contours reflected a substantial
improvement in noise impacts resulting from the operation of the airport, as
the proposed changes to the runway operation modes meant that Ma Wan and a
section of Castle Peak Road were no longer within the 25 Noise Exposure
Forecast (NEF) contours [8]. The study also
reconfirmed the recommendations of the NAMP EIA 1992 and the effectiveness of
the sea channel in maintaining the flushing capacity of North Lantau and Tung
Chung Bay, thereby demonstrating that long-term water quality deterioration
(and associated adverse impacts to marine ecology) was successfully prevented.
2.2.2.1
Since
its opening in 1998, HKIA has been recognised for the quality of its services as evident from worldwide
recognition as the best airport for more than 50 times by different trade /
travel organisations over the past 15 years.
2.2.2.2
HKIA
has achieved similar operational accolades elsewhere, ranked as the world’s
busiest international cargo airport since 1996 [9], and third busiest
airport for international air passengers in 2013 [10]. This rapid growth
in traffic demand is due to many factors including the following:
¡ HKIA’s strategic position within Asia Pacific, allowing it to
develop the best connections which in turn attracts transfer traffic for both
passengers and cargo;
¡ The Hong
Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government’s
progressive liberalisation policy on air services which opened access to a wide
network of destinations worldwide;
¡ Professional airport management, operation and continued investment
in airport infrastructure;
¡ Investments and contributions made by Hong
Kong based airlines and other airport stakeholders; and
¡ Hong Kong’s overall economic growth.
2.2.2.3
Over
the years, HKIA has played a significant role in Hong Kong’s economy, providing
jobs both directly and indirectly (refer to Section 2.4.4) as it experienced high growth
rates in passengers, cargo and air traffic movements, converting it into an international and regional aviation
and logistics hub.
2.2.3.1
A
hub airport is defined as an airport with connections that allow both the
direct and indirect transport and transfer of passengers and cargo between
destinations other than (but nevertheless via), and including, the hub itself.
This means that the airport is not simply for the purpose of transporting local
people, tourists and goods into and out of the territory. A hub airport
performs a larger role by allowing the transfer / transit of passengers and
goods to other destinations via the hub airport, and with it, a wide range of
associated logistical and economic gains for the territory in which the hub
airport is based.
2.2.3.2
An
example of these ‘gains’ is market opportunities. Some direct flights to
destinations with emerging markets are only economically feasible due to the
transfer / transit demand (i.e. there would not be enough demand from local
residents of the two departure / destination cities to enable direct
connections to be commercially viable). In the absence of a hub airport, there
would be next to no transfer / transit passengers and such direct connections
would not exist. Consequently, the associated economic opportunities to these
emerging markets would be lost. A hub airport is thus considered to be a
strategically important component of the competitiveness of a city.
2.2.3.3
As
a hub airport, HKIA serves traffic originating or terminating in Hong Kong (origin-destination
traffic) as well as
transfer traffic of passengers and transhipment of cargo around the world,
facilitated by its capacity and 24-hour operations. More than 100 airlines
provide services between Hong Kong and around 170 destinations, including 50 in
the Mainland. HKIA’s advantageous geographical location at the heart of Asia
Pacific region, together with the growing Mainland market means that nearly half of the
world’s population live within five hours flying time from Hong Kong [12].
2.2.3.4
The
growth in throughput and connectivity that HKIA has experienced since its
commissioning reflects HKIA’s status as an international and
regional aviation hub. In
1998, HKIA handled 28.6 million passengers and 1.6 million tonnes of cargo,
with 450 air traffic movements (ATMs) per day to about 120 destinations [12] or totalling 163,000
ATMs per year (rounded to the nearest thousand) [11]. By the end of 2013,
the level of throughput has risen to 59.9 million passengers and 4.1 million
tonnes of cargo, with more
than double the number of ATMs as compared with 1998 figures. Table 2.1
shows the historical throughput of HKIA between 1998 and 2013.
Table 2.1: Historical Throughput of HKIA (1998 – 2013)
|
Throughput
|
1998
|
2003
|
2008
|
2013
|
|
No. of passengers handled (millions per year)
|
28.6
|
27.4
(-4%)
|
48.6
(70%)
|
59.9
(109%)
|
|
Quantity of cargos handled (million tonnes per year)
|
1.6
|
2.6
(62%)
|
3.6
(125%)
|
4.1
(153%)
|
|
ATMs (per year)
|
163,000
|
188,000
(15%)
|
301,000
(84%)
|
372,000
(128%)
|
Note: ATM numbers have been
rounded to the nearest thousand.
Percentages inside bracket
represent the percentage increases over the corresponding 1998 figures.
2003 is the worst
performance year due to SARS outbreak.
2.2.3.5
This
substantial increase in throughput signifies the importance of HKIA for
transport of passengers and cargo throughout Asia Pacific and beyond. The
importance of maintaining Hong Kong’s hub position is also expressed
in the 2013 Policy Address by the Chief Executive,
“We will continue to improve our aviation,
maritime and land transport facilities and their connectivity, and reinforce
and enhance Hong Kong's role as a regional hub for passenger and cargo
traffic.”
2.2.3.6
To
meet the continued expectations of HKIA as an aviation hub, regular monitoring
of existing and future demand against the capacity of HKIA is needed to ensure
that plans for expansion and improvements to HKIA are optimised to meet demands
without compromising on service quality.
2.2.4 Enhancements
to the Existing Two Runway System
2.2.4.1
As
passenger and cargo demands at HKIA grew, facilities and services at HKIA also
expanded to accommodate. Investment in the infrastructure at HKIA has been
continuous since its opening. At the end of 2011, approximately HK$ 18 billion had already been invested
in capital expenditure for airport-related improvements [12]. These include (but
are not limited to) the following major enhancements / expansion on the airport island [12] [13]:
¡ 2000 – Arrivals Hall was reconfigured to provide better passenger
and transport counter services to airport users;
¡ 2002 – East Hall at Terminal 1 was renovated and expanded to
enhance the airport experience;
¡ 2003 – cross-boundary ferry service of (temporary) SkyPier began,
allowing passenger connection from HKIA to the ports of Macao and the PRD area;
¡ 2005 – six e-channels opened at the Arrivals Immigration Hall to
improve the efficiency of immigration clearance;
¡ 2006 – airfield facilities were enhanced to cater for the new A380
(a double-deck, wide-bodied passenger jet airliner that began commercial
operation in 2007);
¡ 2007 – Terminal 2 (with enhanced cross-boundary airport coach and
limousine services) was completed and began operation;
¡ 2008 – an additional 10 cargo stands and taxiways were added to
cater for increased cargo demand;
¡ 2010 – North Satellite Concourse was completed, improving passenger
convenience and reducing the number of flights that need to park at remote bays.
The permanent SkyPier was also completed; and
¡ 2011 – various capacity and service enhancements to Terminal 1,
including the central concourse, arrival and departure processing, and Baggage
Handling System.
¡ 2014 to 2017 – apron expansion and Midfield
development which will provide additional aircraft parking stands and passenger
concourse / airfield facilities.
2.3 Constraints
of the Existing HKIA to Meet Future Traffic Demand
2.3.1.1
This
section explains why the third runway project is needed and why there is no
other viable alternative to meet the future demands on HKIA.
2.3.2 Purpose
of Airports
2.3.2.1
Airports
worldwide represent international gateways for the transfer of passengers,
goods, and commodities across borders. These activities create a number of
economic benefits that reach far beyond the boundaries of the airport itself.
HKIA, as Hong Kong’s one and only international airport, is the physical
infrastructure needed to permit this air-based transfer and the capacity of
HKIA directly affects the amount of passengers, goods, and commodities that can
be transferred (by air) into and out of Hong Kong. The operation of HKIA is a
fundamental driver for the various economy sectors that rely on passengers, goods, and
commodities that are to be transferred by air.
2.3.2.2
Up
until now, HKIA has grown within the physical limits of the airport island
footprint; providing increased and improved services, and thus meeting the
increasing needs and demands of the various economy
sectors that depend on
air travel / airfreight. However, in order to assess the ability of HKIA to
grow and continue to meet demands relies first and foremost on forecasts for
air traffic demand, which forms the starting point for any such assessment.
2.3.3.1
The
handling capacity of HKIA is primarily constrained by the runway capacity, as
well as the availability of parking facilities and environmental constraints.
The practical maximum
capacity of the existing 2RS is 420,000 ATMs per year. This is
based on a consultancy study by National Air Traffic Services (NATS) endorsed
by Civil Aviation Department (CAD) concluding that 68 ATMs per hour is the
practical maximum regardless of operation mode. There are a combination of factors taken into account including (but not limited to) aircraft fleet mix
at HKIA, terrain constraints imposed by the proximity of Tai Mo Shan, Castle
Peak and other mountainous areas on Lantau Island, complicated airspace
management, and safety compliance requirements imposed by the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [12].
2.3.4 Demand
Projections
2.3.4.1
HKIA’s
design was based on the 1992 NAMP, which estimated that by the Year 2040, the airport would handle 87
million passengers, 8.9 million tonnes of cargo and 376,000 ATMs per
year, the majority of
which would be from origin and destination traffic. However, the enhanced
capacity, scheduling flexibility and connectivity advantages of HKIA coupled
with the rapid development of Hong Kong as a centre of international business
and finance have transformed the
airport from the originally anticipated origin / destination airport into a hub
airport. Simultaneously, air traffic demands have increased dramatically and driven
by market, aircraft mix
has changed, comprising a growing number of narrow-bodied (smaller) aircraft.
Consequently, the recent air traffic demand forecast is now much higher than that was
originally envisaged by the 1992 NAMP at the time HKIA was designed. Forecasts published in 2011 projected
demand to be approximately 97
million passengers, 8.9 million tonnes of cargo and 602,000 ATMs per year by 2030 [12]. These long-term
forecasts have been reviewed by International Air Transport Association (IATA)
and the updated demand projection for 2030 is 102.3 million passengers, 8.9
million tonnes of cargo and 607,000 ATMs.
Table 2.2 shows the projected throughput of HKIA up to
2030.
Table 2.2: Projected Throughput of HKIA Based on the Updated Projections
|
Yearly throughput
|
2020
|
2025
|
2030
|
1992 NAMP
Projection for 2040 (for comparison)
|
|
No. of passengers (in millions)
|
70
|
86
|
102
|
87
|
|
Quantity of cargos (in million tonnes)
|
5.8
|
7.3
|
8.9
|
8.9
|
|
ATMs (rounded to the nearest thousand)
|
420,000
|
505,000
|
607,000
|
376,000
|
2.3.4.2
Further
to Hong Kong International Airport Master Plan 2030 (MP2030), and for the purpose
of EIA, the long-term forecasts have been updated by the IATA in 2013 following
a robust approach. IATA reviewed the models
underlying the forecasts published in 2011 and concluded that the passenger and
cargo equations were still valid. It was further established that Hong Kong’s
economy was bouncing back faster and stronger than anticipated and this
justified revising up HKIA forecasts.
The revised forecasts are based on the latest information made available
to IATA through various sources at the time the forecast was established. In
particular these forecasts included the following factors:
¡ Updated economy forecasts;
¡ 2RS and 3RS constrained capacity; and
¡ Latest strategies of the main
passenger and cargo operators. About 40 passenger and cargo airlines
representing over 80 % of the 2011 busy day ATM have been consulted on their
future offer and fleet in the specific context of the foreseen saturation of
the existing 2RS and future 3RS at HKIA.
2.3.4.3
In
the context of the long-term forecast, IATA anticipates that the 2RS saturation
will happen in 2018. In general, long-term forecasts are needed to provide
directional guidance for planning purposes, but they are not meant to be used
for predicting short-term fluctuations. Based on the latest fast growing slot
demands for 2014 and summer 2015, however, it seems that 2RS saturation may
happen even earlier. It is not uncommon to see accelerated ATM growth before an
airport reaches capacity saturation. Similar trends have been observed at other
airports facing an imminent saturation.
Airlines pre-empt available slots before they become unavailable. The
short-term growth pace will influence when an airport becomes saturated but has
minimal impact on the long-term demand.
2.3.4.4
Relevant details of the air traffic forecasting
methodology are presented in Appendix 2.1.
2.3.5 Comparison
of Actual versus Constrained Demand in the Context of the Practical Maximum
Capacity of the Two-Runway System
2.3.5.1
Chart 2.1 shows
the comparison of actual and projected ATMs up to 2030 in the context of the practical maximum capacity of the
2RS [11]. It was estimated in
MP2030 that the existing two-runway system at HKIA would reach its practical
maximum capacity sometime between 2019 and 2022 [14]. The latest review
by the IATA on MP2030 suggests that this maximum capacity may be reached one to
three years earlier than what was previously projected and presented in MP2030.
2.3.5.2
The
revised air traffic forecasts include a long-term constrained ATM forecast that
takes into account relevant factors including the maximum practical capacities
of the 2RS and 3RS. This ATM forecast cannot be directly compared with
short-term projections and recorded variations in ATM growth rates experienced
at HKIA, especially for the earlier years when HKIA was operating under an
unconstrained environment with respect to runway capacity.
|
Chart 2.1: Actual and Projected ATMs (1998 – 2030)
|
|
Practical Maximum for Two-Runway System @ 420,000 ATM
|
Historical
Values (Table 2.1)
Projected Values (Table 2.2)
|
|
2.3.6.1
As
part of the MP2030 forecasts, a range of external factors that might affect
traffic demand was also reviewed and considered in the forecasting model. These
include air services agreements, cross-strait direct flights, trade agreements,
travel policy, tourism development, cross-boundary infrastructure development,
passengers’ travelling preferences, modal competition from containerised
shipping, developments of surrounding airports and airlines’ strategies. On the
whole, these have been found to have negligible impact or have already been
factored into the traffic demand models. Some of the main factors and queries
raised by stakeholders during the MP2030 studies that have been accounted for
are reviewed below.
Consideration of Aircraft Size
2.3.6.2
It
has been suggested that the capacity constraint could be addressed by airlines
using larger aircraft. Using larger aircraft will allow more passengers and
cargo to transit through HKIA. However, this does not solve the capacity
constraint in terms of ATMs, which will remain capped by the 2RS regardless of
the size of aircrafts deployed. In addition, to be an effective hub HKIA needs
to accommodate a mix of large and narrow-bodied feeder type aircraft so as to
allow access to a broader choice of onward destinations. Without the ability to
fly directly to secondary destinations, passengers will travel via other
regional hubs instead and Hong Kong’s position as an international aviation hub
(with its associated logistical and economic benefits) would be compromised [15]. Based on the MP2030
study, a 3RS would enable
HKIA to handle up to 620,000 ATMs per year [14], thus
meeting the ATM demand
projections for 2030.
Competition from High Speed Rail
2.3.6.3
It
has been suggested that with the development of high speed rail networks
between Hong Kong and cities in the Mainland, air traffic demand to/from the
Mainland will decrease, thereby reducing the need for expanded air services.
2.3.6.4
While
it is considered that the high speed rail may affect the competitiveness of air
travel between Hong Kong and short haul Mainland destinations like Shantou,
Changsha, Nanning, Xiamen, Wuhan, Nanjing, Nanchang and Fuzhou (which are
served by high speed rail connections), these regional Mainland routes combined
equates to only about 3 % of HKIA’s passenger traffic in 2010 [12]. Therefore, the
impact on air traffic demand due to the high speed rail services is considered
to be relatively insignificant in the long term.
2.3.6.5
Conversely,
data from Europe and Japan indicate that the introduction of high speed rail
can increase people’s willingness to travel, which in the medium to long term,
increases the overall market size for both rail and air transportation, thereby
compensating for the potential air traffic loss on individual short haul routes
[12].
Optimisation of Pearl River Delta (PRD)
Airspace
2.3.6.6
There
are queries as to whether the busy PRD airspace would effectively cap the
number of flights that would be permitted to arrive / depart via HKIA, thereby
offsetting any increase in HKIA runway capacity. Flights to/from HKIA using PRD
airspace accounted for only 21 % of total flights served by HKIA in 2012. While
PRD airspace is busy during certain periods of time, it has not been a
constraint to HKIA from an overall development of air services perspective.
There is a plan agreed among relevant civil aviation authorities of Mainland,
Macao and Hong Kong to address the issues relating to optimising PRD airspace.
Thus, it is not expected that growing usage of PRD airspace would affect the
viability of capacity expansion at HKIA.
2.3.7
Review of the Viability of
Alternatives to Airport Expansion
Optimising the Remaining Two-Runway
Capacity
2.3.7.1
The
option of maintaining a 2RS would require further expansion
beyond the already
committed Midfield
development, including the passenger Terminal 1 (T1), apron, passenger concourse, Automated People Mover
(APM) system, Baggage Handling System, road network and landside transportation facilities (refer to Figure 2.1).
However, under the constraint of the practical maximum runway capacity
described in Section
2.3.5, HKIA is unable to meet the air traffic demand forecast (of
607,000 ATMs per year)
for 2030. Under this two-runway option, air traffic demand will be met up
before 2020, at which point, the airport will saturate and will thereafter be
operating under a ‘constrained’ mode, with the same consequences as described
in Section 2.5.
|
Figure 2.1: Optimisation of Two-Runway System
|
|
|
2.3.7.2
It
has been suggested that the airport can be expanded into a 3RS after exhausting the two-runway
capacity. However, this delayed expansion is not considered viable as
differences in airport layouts would mean that a significant amount of
infrastructure built to enhance the 2RS would need to be dismantled to
accommodate a 3RS layout. This
will result in substantial resource wastage and incur greater costs. The added
delay in adopting the 3RS and the time required to construct would also mean that HKIA’s
capacity would be exhausted before the third runway would be built and air
traffic lost to competing airports could be difficult to recover.
2.3.7.3
Overall,
relying on continuous enhancement of the existing airport and not expanding into a 3RS would only provide a short-term
relief to air traffic demands. In the long-term, it is considered that this
approach would impact adversely on Hong Kong’s competitiveness and long-term
growth opportunities.
Co-operation with Neighbouring Airports
2.3.7.4
The
possibility of relying on neighbouring airports in the PRD (Guangzhou,
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Macao airports) to address HKIA’s capacity issues has been
raised as a possible alternative. However, there are many issues with the
viability of this alternative. These include the following:
Restrictions
due to Air Jurisdictions and Air Services Agreements
2.3.7.5
Air
services are governed by a series of jurisdiction-specific regulations as well
as international bilateral agreements. Both HKIA and airlines that route to or
via HKIA are required to operate within these regulations which are set by the
corresponding governments of individual jurisdictions. Consequently, it is not
permitted to simply funnel airlines and flights to different airports purely
based on the preferences of HKIA. In the case of Hong Kong and any of the PRD
airports, the fact that they do not belong to the same administrative region
further complicates matters as they have separate governments, administrative
systems, currencies, border controls and immigration requirements, air services
agreements, airport operators, stakeholders and designated and operating
airlines [15].
2.3.7.6
It
should be noted that there is airport cooperation in terms of knowledge transfer
and management of shared networks. This form of cooperation is typically
founded on the basis of air traffic flying between the cooperating airports
(e.g. the cooperation pact between Singapore’s Changi Airport and Japan’s
Narita Airport [16]). Even services
between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, such as the proposed rail link connecting Hong
Kong and Shenzhen airports, aim at increasing convenience of travel between
airports as a form of enhanced customer choice [12]. This form of
cooperation is entirely different from the idea of re-routing flights
originally bound for (or originally departing from) HKIA, to Shenzhen instead,
which refers to a form of unilateral bypass rather than mutual cooperation, and
is typically only performed during emergency situations. There are also no
known successful examples of this latter type of cooperation between airports.
Attempts to link London’s Heathrow and Gatwick Airports, or Montréal’s Mirabel
and Dorval Airports, have not been successful [15], despite being
located in the same jurisdiction (due mainly to user preferences). Proposals
for a high speed rail link between Heathrow and Gatwick to create a virtual hub
is still under review and its viability (and user acceptability) remains to be
confirmed.
Inconvenience to Passenger and Cargo
Logistics
2.3.7.7
A
hub airport, as previously defined, needs to be able to support a substantial
proportion of transfer / transit traffic. To re-direct this transfer / transit
traffic to another airport for the first or second part of the journey
essentially eliminates the benefits to airlines and passengers of directing
their flights via HKIA in the first place. Operation of a dual-airport concept
not only adds inconvenience to travellers, but also incurs additional time and resource depletions
affecting both the scheduling and affordability of the journey. Transferring
traffic between airports via rail or road links also adds to the burden of
existing infrastructure and generates additional environmental impacts such as air and noise emissions, potential
ecological issues, visual impacts, etc. Given the lack of benefits to passengers and the airfreight
industry, these users will simply opt for other airports to make their transfer
journeys, thus essentially eradicating the transfer / transit traffic at HKIA,
and its hub status.
Loss of Economic Benefits and
Competitiveness
2.3.7.8
Relying
on other airports to meet Hong Kong’s air traffic demand reduces benefit to
Hong Kong’s economy. By redirecting flights to airports outside of Hong Kong,
airfreight operators may no longer obtain any advantage by basing their
operations in Hong Kong, and will consequently relocate their operations
elsewhere. Similarly, international business sectors that require a highly
mobile workforce may also shift their operation centres to other cities that
can better serve their travel needs, consequently diminishing the overall
competitiveness of Hong Kong.
2.3.8
Conclusion
of the Demand Analysis
2.3.8.1
As
explained in Section
2.3.2,
airports are a fundamental driver for the various economy sectors that
rely on passengers, goods, and commodities that are to be transferred by air.
However, the MP2030 air traffic forecasts and demand analysis presented in Section 2.3.4 has shown that demand will soon exceed the existing maximum capacity
of HKIA taking into consideration the effects of external factors such as
aircraft size, competition from high speed rail and optimisation of PRD
airspace. Maintaining the 2RS is not a sustainable solution and the notion of
cooperation with neighbouring airports is not a viable alternative. All in all,
the analysis clearly demonstrates that the future air traffic demand cannot be
met with the existing 2RS.
2.3.8.2
Once
the maximum capacity of the 2RS is reached, a series of impacts will affect the
operation of HKIA, which are detailed in Section 2.5. To avoid the wider impacts
associated with suppressing the demand that can be met by advance planning, HKIA needs to develop in tandem with
demand, which necessitates a 3RS.
Implication of Lead Time
2.3.8.3
Airport
infrastructure
development is capital investment-intensive, and due to the scale and
complexity of the construction works, a long lead time with considerable
advance planning is required. It is estimated that the 3RS would take approximately 11
years from planning to completion and hence 2023 is the earliest it could be expected
to start
commissioning [17].
With the growing competition from other rapidly developing aviation hubs in the
Asia Pacific region such as Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Singapore, Taipei and
airports in the Mainland like Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Shanghai (some of which
plan up to five runways) [18],
investing in a 3RS
is an urgent requirement for HKIA to meet and capture the forecasted demand
and retain its pre-eminent hub status, thereby retaining its competitive and
economic advantages.
2.4 Benefits
of the Project
2.4.1.1
This
section describes the scenarios with the project, and the benefits associated
with a 3RS at HKIA.
2.4.2.1
The proposed project involves construction of a number of new airport infrastructure and
facilities, all aimed at improving the operational efficiency of the airport
and the associated quality of services to passengers and the airfreight
industry. These facilities include new passenger concourses, a revamped
Terminal 2 (T2), an expanded APM and a new high-speed Baggage Handling System
(BHS) and associated facilities, all of which will contribute to improving and
maintaining the existing high quality of services for passengers. The
airfreight industry will benefit from increased facilities including new
aircraft stands and associated airfreight handling facilities as well as an
improved road network at the cargo areas. Infrastructure improvements will also
provide better road networks, car parking and public transport facilities for
increased passenger convenience when travelling to and from the airport.
2.4.2.2
As
well as providing an opportunity for developing new world class airport
facilities and infrastructure the proposed third runway project provides a
unique opportunity to learn from experiences gained in operating existing
facilities, including knowledge on operational constraints to explore
operational and efficiency improvements during re-configuration of existing facilities.
For instance, providing some buffer to ATMs, BHS, parking capacity and airside
and landside road networks will
permit HKIA to prepare better operational contingency for handling and
recovering from emergencies or occasional service disruptions due to abnormal
incidents, such as typhoons, so that impacts to passenger and airfreight can be
kept to a minimum.
2.4.2.3
With
expanded runway capacity, some flexibility in the operation of the 3RS will be made possible. For example,
as suggested in the MP2030, the South Runway will be
assigned to standby mode during night time (where possible) to reduce noise
impacts to residents of North Lantau.
2.4.3.1
Air
connectivity refers to the number of destinations served and the frequency of
flights to each destination. A world class airport is one that is able to offer
both a wide choice of destinations and departure / arrival times as well as
high quality ground-based services. It should also have the capacity to modify
existing routes and open new routes to keep in line with changing passenger and
market-driven demands.
2.4.3.2
At
the same time, it is widely recognised that air connectivity is crucially
important for international business and trade. Trade sectors that provide
international products and services require mobile workforces and a frequent
and reliable air service to enable them to operate flexibly and within tight
time constraints. Increasing air connectivity makes Hong Kong a more attractive
location for foreign investment and setting up of regional headquarters, thus
forming part of the cycle that perpetuates economic growth.
2.4.3.3
With
the proposed expansion
of HKIA, flight capacity will increase which is a precursor to increased air
connectivity. According to the MP2030 study, with an additional (third) runway,
HKIA will be able to
support a practical maximum capacity of 620,000 ATMs per year, which translates
to 102 ATMs per hour (compared to the practical maximum of 68 ATMs per hour
based on a 2RS) [12]. The additional ATM
capacity would allow HKIA to increase the frequency of flights to existing
destinations, provide more reliable air services, and open up new destinations,
thereby increasing HKIA’s air connectivity and the associated trade and
economic benefits. For passengers, this translates into the direct benefits of more
choices in airlines and routes, reduced time spent in transit and waiting time due to better
‘matching’ of (and more choices in) departure and arrival times, as well as the
better services such as reliability, punctuality and quality of travel
experience [19].
2.4.4 Economic
Benefits
Direct Employment
2.4.4.1
The
aviation industry is known to be a major source of employment. HKIA is one of
the biggest single-site employers in Hong Kong, supporting about 65,000 direct
jobs on the existing airport
island in 2010. It is estimated that the proposed expansion would increase direct
employment to 141,000 by 2030 [12].
2.4.4.2
Indirect
jobs are those that involve supplies of goods or services to the aviation
sector and non-aviation activities at HKIA, and induced jobs refer to those
jobs that are supported by the spending of income by direct and indirect
employees associated with HKIA. When these jobs are factored into the equation,
HKIA effectively generates a total of approximately 199,000 indirect and
induced jobs by 2030. This growth will be possible as a result of the proposed
airport expansion.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
2.4.4.3
HKIA
is an international and regional aviation centre providing social and economic
contributions to Hong Kong. It supports the
four pillar industries of Hong Kong’s economy: financial services, trading and
logistics, tourism, and producer and professional services, which in 2010
accounted for 58 % of Hong Kong's GDP [20]. The aviation industry and other
businesses at HKIA contribute significantly to Hong Kong's economy, making HK$ 78 billion in value added total
economic contributions in 2008, which represented 4.6 % of Hong Kong's GDP at
the time [20]. According to Oxford
Economics, the aviation sector contributed HK$ 88.9 billion or 5.5 % of Hong Kong’s GDP in 2009 of which 57
% were directly contributed through the outputs of the aviation sector, 26 %
were indirectly contributed through aviation sector’s supply chain, and 17 %
were contributed through the spending by employees of the aviation sector and
its supply chain [19].
2.4.4.4
As
global GDP grows, the aviation market will also grow, and demand for airport
services (and associated economic contributions) will continue to rise. Given
Hong Kong’s open market and externally-oriented economy, similar relationship
between GDP and air traffic growth exists in Hong Kong (refer to Chart 2.2 below) [12].
|
Chart 2.2: Comparison Between Actual and Derived HKIA Passenger Traffic Based on Hong Kong GDP
|
|
|
2.4.4.5
It
has been estimated that a 10 % improvement in connectivity relative to GDP
would see a HK$ 1 billion per
annum increase in long-run GDP for the Hong Kong economy [19]. With the
proposed third runway
project, the MP2030 study projected that HKIA would bring HK$ 912 billion in economic net present
value by 2030 [12].These benefits arise because airports
are gateways to global economies and vital for business activities as well as
family and leisure travels.
HKIA serves as a transit point for one third of its passengers, and in terms of
freight value, a third of Hong Kong’s total imports, exports and re-exports
pass through HKIA [18]. The ability of Hong Kong to sustain
its competitive position in today’s highly globalised economy is therefore
significantly attributed to the high-value products and services as well as the
highly skilled and mobile professional workforce that is reliant on, and
supported by, HKIA [18]. Economic growth in
this sector is thus directly dependent on growth (via expansion) of HKIA.
International Business
2.4.4.6
Global
connectivity is essential to Hong Kong and its
economy. The connections that an airport creates between cities and markets
generate benefits through enabling foreign direct investment, business
clusters, specialisation and other spill-over impacts on an economy’s
productive capacity [19]. Hong Kong’s
position as an international aviation hub has undoubtedly contributed to making Hong Kong the world’s fourth
and Asia’s second largest foreign direct investment recipient [18].
2.4.4.7
In
Hong Kong, an estimated 3,500 regional offices provide employment to about
140,000 people [17]. Domestic firms gain
economic benefit from increased connectivity through increased access to
foreign markets and increased foreign competition in the home market, and
through freer movement of investment capital and workers between countries [19]. As revealed by an
international study, 64 % of firms consider aviation a decisive factor in
locating certain types of economic activities, particularly those involving
investment decisions [18]. Increased connectivity also brings
knock-on benefits associated with increased competition from foreign-based
producers, which encourages greater efficiency and drives down prices for
consumers [19].
2.4.4.8
Air
transport also plays a vital role in the cross boundary trade of goods,
particularly high value and perishable goods. Globally, 35 % of the world trade
by value is transported by air, with HKIA supporting 36 % of Hong Kong’s
external trade by value via air transport in 2012 [21].
2.4.4.9
Equally
important is the tourism sector’s contribution to the economy, where over 48
million visitors spent over HK$ 290 billion in the local economy in 2012 [22]. According to Oxford
Economics, the tourism (catalytic) effects of aviation involved an employment
of 101,000 people in 2009
[19]. With expansion
of the airport to meet anticipated future demand, Hong Kong based businesses reliant on global connectivity and
tourism can continue to grow and contribute to Hong Kong’s economy.
Interface with Mainland China and the Pearl River
Delta
2.4.4.10
Mainland
is the manufacturing capital of the world, and the World Tourism Organisation
(WTO) has also projected it to become the world’s fourth-largest tourist source
market and the largest domestic tourist market by 2015 [12]. Given this trend,
the MP2030 study forecasted that overall aggregated air traffic to and from the
Mainland alone would reach nearly 2.1 billion trips and 44 million tonnes of
cargo traffic by 2030 [12]. The PRD is one of the
fastest growing areas in the Mainland, and forms part of the catchment area of
HKIA. The MP2030 study forecasted air traffic demand in the Greater Pearl River
Delta (GPRD - which includes Hong Kong and Macao) to reach 387 million
passenger trips and 18 million tonnes of cargo by 2030 [12]. Despite the
increase in capacity of other airports within the PRD as well as potential
impacts to short haul air travel between Hong Kong and Mainland China due to
the development of the Guangdong – Hong Kong Express Rail Link, significant
unfulfilled demand is still anticipated both in the medium and the long term
(up to 2030). This is shown in Chart 2.3 [12].
|
Chart 2.3: GPRD Airports Capacity and Forecast Passenger Demand (2020 and 2030) Based on
MP2030
|
|
|
2.4.4.11
With
an unconstrained handling capacity, HKIA was able to capture about 80 % of the
GPRD airports’ international passengers and about 90 % of its international
cargo throughput in 2008 [12]. HKIA is well
positioned to continue to capture a majority of this market as long as its
handling capacity remains unconstrained.
The proposed project will enable HKIA to maintain this advantageous
position.
2.4.5
Environmental
Improvements
2.4.5.1
It
is unavoidable that a development
of this scale will have impacts
on the environment, which are
identified and addressed in this EIA with the aim of avoiding
(where practicable)
and at the very least, minimising such
impacts to within acceptable levels. Nevertheless, there are opportunities, at the project’s design, construction and operation
stages, for incorporating positive
environmental aspects into the project.
Allowing More Flexibility to
Avoid Night Time Use of Southern Runway for the Benefits of North Lantau
Residents
2.4.5.2
Current
operation of HKIA requires
night time use
of the South
Runway due to the
existing high demand and the scheduled
closure of North Runway for maintenance purposes. This means that
some residents
along North Lantau are currently covered by NEF contours. With the
implementation of the 3RS,
scheduling flexibility would be improved, and preference can be given to
avoiding the need for operation of the South Runway during night time by shifting
night time air traffic
movements to the centre runway or new North Runway. This would reduce the number of
noise sensitive receivers (NSRs) covered by the NEF contours.
Increased Flexibility to
Preferential Use of Flight Tracks for Avoiding Aircraft Noise Impact
2.4.5.3
Addition of a third
runway provides increased flexibility in aircraft operations. This would,
in turn, allow for increased
flexibility in the
implementation of preferential flight track use for aircraft landing and take-off with the aim of
further minimising air traffic
movements over populated areas.
Minimising Unnecessary Aircraft
Emissions while Waiting for Landing
2.4.5.4
Increased
runway capacity provided by the third runway also means that aircraft landing
slots would increase, and this would reduce the waiting time required for
approaching aircrafts to land. Reduced landing time provides the benefit of
reducing airspace congestion and the associated emissions arising from
aircrafts ‘circling’ the airport. Similar reductions in waiting time for
take-off and taxiing into parking stands would also reduce idling emissions.
These measures can only be implemented with the additional capacity and
flexibility resulting from implementation of the 3RS.
Beneficial Use of Unwanted
Materials Generated by Other Local Projects
2.4.5.5
Inert
construction & demolition (C&D) materials generated by other local
projects and accumulated in the government’s public fill reception facilities
would be used for the land formation work of this project. This will, on one hand, allow for the
beneficial use of a substantial amount of such unwanted materials, and on the
other hand, will minimise the need for import of raw materials for land
formation.
Incorporating Best Practice
Environmental Efficiencies into Airport Buildings and Facilities
2.4.5.6
The
design process for new development at HKIA is predicated on the identification
of opportunities for incorporating elements into the design of facilities and
infrastructure that are able to enhance environmental efficiency and minimise
environmental impacts over the building / facility lifecycle. Opportunities for
efficiency must be considered for both the construction and operations stages.
2.4.5.7
Energy
efficiency will be built into the new airport facilities, including the
expanded T2 and third runway concourse (TRC) buildings, which will adopt
efficient cooling systems combined with building envelopes and other design
elements that reduce cooling energy demand; efficient light-emitting diode
(LED) lighting and occupancy / sensor control technologies that reduce energy
demand combined with building façade designs that reduce the need for
artificial lighting. On-site emissions will be minimised through the increasing
use of electric vehicles and ground support equipment making use of grid
powered fixed-ground power and pre-conditioned air systems to be provided at
stands (instead of diesel powered auxiliary generators / cooling units).
Several other innovative technologies and systems are being evaluated as
designs progress.
2.4.5.8
Efficient
water management will comprise various systems intended to reduce water demand
and encourage water reuse. These will include extending the use of seawater for
cooling and flushing to minimise potable water demand, the adoption of low flow
water fixtures and the implementation of a greywater collection and treatment
system to treat greywater generated from certain new airport facilities for
beneficial reuse (e.g. landscape irrigation or cleaning related activities).
2.4.5.9
Waste
recycling initiatives during operation phase will build on existing HKIA good
practice in this area in existing buildings and facilities. Initiatives will include provision for
on-site waste collection and separation facilities for food waste and glass
bottles as well as the standard recycling bins for paper, plastic and metal
cans. Green procurement strategies will be required both during construction
and operation of the project, to minimise waste generation and maximise re-use
and recycling opportunities.
2.5 Consequences
of Not Proceeding with the Project
2.5.1.1
This
section describes the scenarios without the proposed project and the
consequences associated with restriction of HKIA as a 2RS.
2.5.2 Airport
and the Aviation Industry
2.5.2.1
Investment
in airport infrastructure has been continuous since the opening of HKIA, with
HK$ 18 billion
already invested and more than HK$ 12 billion committed to the Midfield development and Apron Expansion [23] (refer to Section 2.2.4). These
investments are part of the upgrading works to maintain operation of HKIA ahead
of air traffic demand (i.e. maintain unconstrained operation mode), however,
the airport is approaching the physical limit of expansion within the existing
airport footprint. Under the current 2RS, the MP2030 study identified that the maximum practical runway
capacity would be 68 ATMs per hour, and this maximum was expected to be reached
between 2019 and 2022 [12]. Latest information
suggests that this maximum capacity may be reached one to three years earlier
than previously projected. In the absence of a third runway, HKIA will have to
operate under a constrained mode and the implications are described below.
Implications of a ‘Constrained’ Operation
Mode
2.5.2.2
Constrained
mode refers to a mode of operation where demand (for aircraft landing and
take-off slots) exceeds supply (availability of landing and take-off slots).
When an airport changes its operation mode from ‘unconstrained’ to
‘constrained’, a series of consequential reactions will typically occur,
leading to impacts that reach far beyond the boundaries of the airport itself.
The most immediately and directly affected areas include the airport operators,
the airline operators, and the aviation industry in general. Chart 2.4 summarises
the sequence of impacts that are expected to occur. These are based on
experience by other hub airports overseas such as London Heathrow Airport, as well as experience from the
constrained operation of Kai Tak Airport in the past.
Airport Operation
2.5.2.3
With
an airport operating at full capacity, the risk of congestion during landing
and take-off will increase, and aircraft parking on the ground and at the gates will
also be restricted. Apart from the increased holding time required for aircraft
waiting to take off / land (which generates additional air and noise
emissions), a congested airport has limited room to cater for operational
delays, and such delays can have a much greater knock-on effect for other air traffic movements, ultimately increasing the
time required to negate the effects of the delay and restore scheduled
operations.
2.5.2.4
Similarly,
an airport running at full operational capacity has limited flexibility to cope
with more significant disruptions such as severe adverse weather conditions or
other unforeseen incidents such as security breaches. These disruptions
typically result in a substantial backlog of flights that not only frustrate
passengers but also generate congested and disorderly service at the airport
terminals. The baggage / cargo handling system may also be disrupted, resulting
in residual delays even after the airport returns to normal operation. In some
instances, baggage and cargo may be damaged or lost, thereby further affecting
customers as well as the airport. All of these factors contribute to an overall
deterioration of the quality of service at the airport.
Airline Operations
2.5.2.5
Airports
that operate under a constrained mode typically experience changes in air traffic
patterns as airlines try to optimise their operations within a constrained
airport. Past experience at Kai Tak Airport has shown that there will normally
be a transition period when airlines try to adapt to the capacity constraint by
switching to larger aircraft in order to keep up with continued passenger and
cargo demands, and then perhaps preferential routing and a switch to
origin-and-destination focus.
2.5.2.6
Preferential
routing arises when airlines have to make a decision between routes of
different profitability. When the airport only has a limited number of slots,
airlines typically cut down on those routes that are less profitable in favour
of the more lucrative routes. A reduction in frequency of certain routes leads
to reduced passenger choice, increased connection time and potentially higher
price that passengers must pay [12]. Routes that are
eliminated from the network altogether mean that passengers must resort to
other means by which to travel. These changes lead to the single outcome of a
loss in passenger and cargo business, both for the airlines and for the
airport.
2.5.2.7
A
switch to origin-and-destination routes is another likely consequence of constrained airport operation, as
airlines need to focus the limited slots for higher yield
origin-and-destination routes rather than the lower yield transfer / transit
network. A hub airport by definition requires a substantial proportion of
transfer / transit traffic. However with a reduction in the number of routes
being offered by airlines, this transfer / transit traffic will correspondingly
decrease, and the hub status of the airport (with its associated logistical and
economic benefits) will be lost.
Aviation Industry
2.5.2.8
Growth
in the aviation industry in Hong Kong is
directly reliant on the capacity of HKIA. When HKIA reaches its maximum
two-runway capacity, no new routes or increased frequency of existing routes
can be made unless existing flights were to be substituted. This would
effectively cap the growth of the aviation industry in Hong Kong. The resulting economic losses will be
translatable to a reduction in the aviation industry’s contribution to Hong
Kong’s GDP.
Chart 2.4: Summary of Impacts to Airport and the Aviation Industry Resulting
from ‘Constrained’
Airport Operation
|
Constrained
Airport Operation
|
1st
tier impacts
(Impacts that are expected
to occur as an immediate result of constrained airport operation)
|
2nd
tier impacts
(Impacts that are expected
to occur as a result of the 1st tier impact)
|
3rd
tier impacts
(Impacts that are expected
to occur as a further consequence of the 1st and 2nd
tier impacts)
|
Ultimate impact
|
|
When all arrival and departure slots are
full
|
Limited
flexibility for handling service disruptions / delays
|
Longer time
required to restore to normal operations after a disruption
|
Deterioration
in the quality of airport services
|
Airport operations
|
|
|
|
Airlines deploy
larger aircraft to meet passenger / cargo demands
|
Airlines
shrink the frequency of less profitable routes, or
eliminate these routes altogether
|
Passengers
experience longer connection times and higher prices
|
Passengers
switch to other airports to reach less profitable destinations
|
Loss of
passenger and cargo business
|
Airlines focus
on origin / destination traffic and reduce transfer / transit traffic
|
Loss of
transfer / transit passengers and cargo
|
Loss of ‘hub’
airport status
|
Airline operations
|
|
|
|
Loss of
economic benefits associated with aviation industry growth
|
Halt in the
growth of the aviation industry in Hong Kong
|
Reduced
contribution to Hong Kong’s GDP
|
Aviation industry
|
|
|
Resulting Impacts on
Passengers and Cargo
2.5.2.9
From
the perspective of airport users, the aforementioned implications on airport
and airline operations ultimately have a detrimental effect on activities that
are dependent on the airport. A summary of the impacts to passengers and cargo
is listed in Table 2.3.
Table
2.3: Summary of Impacts to Passengers and Cargo due to
‘Constrained’
Airport
Operation
|
Impact associated with ‘constrained’ airport
operation
|
Impacts to Passengers
|
Impacts to
Cargo and Cargo-dependent Businesses
|
|
Airport
Operations
|
|
|
|
Increased probability for disruptions due to less
operational flexibility
|
Greater
likelihood of flight delays
Increased risk
of disruption to personal schedule
|
Greater
likelihood of delays in sending / receiving goods
Increased risk
to time-sensitive cargo (e.g. fresh
meat, fruit and flowers)
|
|
Longer time required to restore to normal operations
after a disruption
|
Greater
likelihood of flight cancellation
Longer waiting
time for next available flight
Increased
risks of personal luggage damage or loss
More crowded
and disorderly experience at the airport
Personal /
business time lost
|
Greater
likelihood of cargo not arriving at intended destination
Loss of
perishable goods in waiting for next available flight
Increased risk
of damage to cargo
Loss of income
to cargo-dependent businesses
|
|
Airline
Operations
|
|
|
|
Preferential routing with associated reduction / loss
of less popular routes / destinations
|
Reduced choice
of flight dates / times
Less
destinations with direct flights
Less
flexibility / longer wait time for connecting flights
Increased cost
of flights
|
Less
flexibility in cargo scheduling
More time
required for cargo to reach destinations
Increased cost
to cargo company and cargo-dependent businesses
|
|
Switch to origin-and-destination routes with
associated reduction in transit / transfer network
|
Less
opportunity to ‘stopover’ in Hong Kong
Less choice
for arranging own transit via Hong Kong
(i.e. greater difficulty in customising own flights and connections)
|
Less options
for routing of cargo
Cargo
companies may be forced to do business through another airport instead
Loss of
business for Hong Kong based cargo companies
|
|
Aviation
Industry
|
|
|
|
No / less new routes available
|
Less choice
for obtaining flights to new destinations
No direct
flights available to new destinations
Increased time
required to reach new destinations
|
Less options
for routing cargo to new destinations
Increased time
and cost for airfreight to reach new destinations
Greater
difficulty in competing with other (non-Hong Kong based) cargo businesses for
new business
|
2.5.2.10
Table 2.3 highlights that all of the identified
impacts to airport and airline operations and the aviation industry will have
knock-on impacts to passengers, cargo and cargo-dependent businesses. While
international airlines and cargo businesses can re-organise their operations to
some extent to adjust to the constraints at HKIA, there is no such option for
Hong Kong based travellers or travellers to Hong Kong, who will be faced with
the only alternative of not travelling via HKIA. For those travellers who must
travel via HKIA, the quality of the airport experience that can be achieved
with a congested airport operating under constrained mode is unlikely to be
equivalent to the world class quality of services that HKIA has been
internationally recognised for since 2001.
2.5.3
Hong Kong’s
Competitiveness
2.5.3.1
History
has shown that whenever an international hub airport (such as London’s Heathrow
Airport and Tokyo’s Narita Airport) can no longer keep up with the
air traffic demand in the region, they inevitably surrender their leading air
hub position to other airports in their respective regions. Without the
proposed airport expansion, HKIA’s
connectivity advantage and international hub position would eventually be lost
to neighbouring airports that go ahead with expansion plans. This has
implications on the overall competitiveness of Hong Kong,
as its position as an international business centre is clearly linked to the
world class standing of HKIA. When HKIA is no longer a leading hub airport in
Asia Pacific, the market share of the Hong Kong
logistics industry (including freight forwarding and insurance) would shrink,
and the competitiveness of these HKIA-reliant industries will be adversely
affected.
2.5.4.1
While
it is given that the absence of the project would not create any new
environmental impacts, the absence of the project may lead to a worsening of
the environmental performance in some areas, and would also severely constrain
the potential environmental improvements that can be accrued from operation of
HKIA. As described in Section
2.5.2, with an airport operating at full capacity, air traffic
congestion would increase, leading to increased holding times for take-off and
landing. This would increase aircraft emissions both on the ground (while
aircrafts wait for take-off, or wait for a vacant parking stand) and in the
local airspace (while aircrafts wait to land). An airport operating at full
capacity would also not have any spare capacity for preferential use of runways
and flight paths. Instead, flights on existing routes over populated areas
would only increase to capacity, thereby potentially worsening aircraft noise
impacts to populated areas. Other environmental improvements as described in Section 2.4.5 would
also not be realised in the absence of the project.
2.6
Summary
2.6.1.1
HKIA
has always been recognised as an important infrastructure asset supporting
the economic development
of Hong Kong. When Kai Tak Airport began to experience constrained operation,
increasing adverse impacts to both the economy and the environment
(particularly in terms of noise) was apparent. Relocation of the airport to
Chek Lap Kok was a strategic decision to prevent long-term economic loss as
well as to improve the environmental quality of the urban Kowloon area. This
decision was pivotal to enabling the success that Hong Kong continues to enjoy
as one of the key players in the international arena for the economic sectors
of finance, trade, logistics, tourism and professional services. From an
environmental perspective, selection of the Chek Lap Kok location created less
environmental impacts overall compared to other viable options, hence the Chek
Lap Kok location was seen as the best way forward for both economic and
environmental reasons at the time.
2.6.1.2
As of 2013, HKIA continues to enjoy a pre-eminent
status as an international aviation hub ranked as the world’s busiest international
cargo airport since 1996 [9]. HKIA is
also the third busiest
airport for international air passengers in 2013 [10]. While part of this is
due to geographical, legislative and management factors and contributions, it
is also the current ‘unconstrained’ operation mode that has permitted HKIA to
continue to perform on par with globally increasing demands. However, the
current HKIA operation has been
approaching the maximum capacity of 420,000 ATMs per year that is practicable with a 2RS. Air
traffic demand projections in MP2030 have forecasted
that the maximum 2RS capacity of HKIA will be exhausted between 2019 and 2022 [14] and will
not able to cope with the air traffic demand of 602,000 ATMs per year by 2030
predicted in MP2030 [12]. According to the latest review by IATA,
this maximum capacity may be reached one to three years earlier than previously
projected. In the absence of the proposed 3RS, HKIA would have to face the challenges of operation
under a ‘constrained’ mode, which would, in turn, result in degradation of airport service
quality, customer choice and economic contribution to Hong
Kong. Inevitably, HKIA would even lose its international
aviation hub status and Hong
Kong in general would suffer from diminishing competitiveness and economic slowdown as compared to neighbouring regions.
2.6.1.3
To
secure the continual growth of HKIA operation and to avoid the potential
impacts that may arise from constraining the operation of HKIA in the near
future, expansion of HKIA into a 3RS is required. This would create additional benefits by enabling
further improvements to airport service quality; providing more choices to
airport users in addition to increased operational flexibility, which would
permit runway operations to better take into account the needs and concerns of
nearby residents. Expansion of HKIA would also provide a number of economic
benefits including increased direct and indirect employment, GDP contribution
and Hong Kong’s capture of the international business and trade markets. A
number of environmental improvements would also be realised including avoidance
of night time operations at the South Runway; increased
flexibility on preferential use of flight tracks to minimise aircraft noise
impact to populated areas; reduced aircraft taxiing and holding times to
minimise aircraft emissions; beneficial use of fill materials generated by
other projects; and improvements to the energy efficiency, water conservation
and waste recycling at airport buildings and facilities.
2.6.1.4
Given
that future air traffic demand is also dependent on a number of external
factors, a review of other key factors that may influence the future air
traffic demand in Hong Kong has been carried out, including the aircraft mix,
competition from high speed rail and optimisation of PRD airspace. The analysis
suggests that these external factors will not significantly affect or reduce
the projected air traffic demand in Hong Kong.
2.6.1.5
Alternatives to meet future increasing air traffic demand besides the proposed
airport expansion were also considered. The option to optimise the 2RS which
can only provide a short-term relief is not a sustainable
option. The notion of
cooperation with neighbouring airports to meet future air traffic demand is not
viable, due to regulatory constraints as well as passenger and cargo
inconvenience, and provides next to no economic benefit to Hong Kong.
2.6.1.6
It
is therefore concluded that there is a
genuine need for the proposed project and that justification for the
proposed 3RS, as opposed to other alternatives, has been demonstrated.
2.7 References
|
[1]
|
Civil Aviation Department, "Kai Tak Airport
1925-1998," [Online]. Available:
http://www.cad.gov.hk/english/kaitak.html.
|
|
[2]
|
Hong Kong Legislative Council (Legco), "Official
Report of Proceedings - Wednesday 31 October 1990," [Online]. Available:
http://ebook.lib.hku.hk/bldho/legco/LegcoBL043.pdf.
|
|
[3]
|
Civil Aviation Department, "Hong Kong Air Transport
System Long Term Planning and Investigation Working Paper No.1 – Initial Site
Short Listing," The Ralph M. Parsons Company, 1973.
|
|
[4]
|
Government Secretariat, Lands & Works Branch,
"Port & Airport Development Strategy (PADS) Final Report,"
December 1989.
|
|
[5]
|
Territory Development Department, South West N.T. ,
"North Lantau Development Study (NLDS) Final Report, Volume 2:
Appendices," April 1992.
|
|
[6]
|
Provisional Airport Authority Hong Kong, "New Airport
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|
|
[7]
|
Environmental Protection Department, "Environmental
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|
|
[8]
|
Airport Authority Hong Kong, "New Airport Master Plan
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|
|
[9]
|
Airport Authority Hong Kong, "Our Business, Air
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|
|
[10]
|
Airports Council International, "International
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|
|
[11]
|
Airport Authority Hong Kong, "HKIA 2030 Primary
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http://vps.hongkongairport.com/mp2030/consultancy_report/IATA.pdf.
|
|
[12]
|
Airport Authority Hong Kong, "Hong Kong International
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|
|
[13]
|
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|
|
[14]
|
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|
|
[15]
|
Cathay Pacific Airways, "A Third Runway at HKIA is
Crucial to Hong Kong’s Economic Future, June 2011.," City University of
Hong Kong. Public Policy Roundtable Series 8 – Challenges of Economic
Integration: Airport Expansion and Infrastructure Development in PRD Area.,
[Online]. Available:
http://www6.cityu.edu.hk/garc/ARC/ARCfile/PF/roundtable8_files/Vincent_li.pdf.
|
|
[16]
|
Narita International Airport Corporation, "Press Release:
Changi Airport Group and Narita International Airport Corporation sign
cooperation pact," 28 May 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://www.naa.jp/en/press/pdf/20120528_3.pdf.
|
|
[17]
|
Brian Pearce, IATA Chief Economist, "Third Runway in
Hong Kong," Commentary in ‘Hong Kong Economic Journal’, October 2012.
[Online]. Available:
http://www.iata.org/pressroom/Documents/Oped-Third-Runway-Hong-Kong-Oct2012.pdf.
|
|
[18]
|
Airport Study Group, "Urgent Greenlight for Third
Runway - Critical to Hong Kong’s Future," Hong Kong Ideas Centre,
December 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://www.ideascentre.hk/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/report-for-hkia-eng.pdf.
|
|
[19]
|
Oxford Economics, "Economic Benefits from Air
Transport in Hong Kong," Hong Kong country report, 2011.
|
|
[20]
|
Airport Authority Hong Kong, " Future Development, An
Engine for Growth, Economic Contribution," [Online]. Available:
http://www.hongkongairport.com/eng/future/an-engine-for-growth/economic-contribution.html.
|
|
[21]
|
Air Transport Action Group, "Aviation Benefits Beyond
Borders," September 2013.
|
|
[22]
|
Hong Kong Tourism Board, "A Statistical Review of Hong
Kong Tourism," Research, Hong Kong Tourism Board, 2012.
|
|
[23]
|
Airport Authority Hong Kong, "Future Development,
Medium-Term Development," [Online]. Available:
http://www.hongkongairport.com/eng/future/medium-term-development/index.html.
|