Content


Chapter Title

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 Objectives

6.1.2 Scope of Work

6.1.3 Risk Criteria

6.2 Methodology

6.2.2 Hazard Identification

6.2.3 Frequency Assessment

6.2.4 Consequence Modelling

6.2.5 Risk Summation

6.2.6 Recommended Safety Measures

6.3 Existing Aviation Supply and Distribution System

6.3.1 Supply of Jet Fuel to Aviation Fuel Tank Farm

6.3.2 Aviation Fuel Tank Farm

6.3.3 Existing Hydrant System (Ring Main)

6.3.4 Hydrant Pit

6.3.5 Hydrant Dispenser

6.4 Existing Safety Features

6.4.2 Leak Detection System

6.4.3 Emergency Fuel Shutdown System

6.4.4 Dual Pilot Device/Lanyard

6.4.5 Dead-man Switch

6.4.6 Brake Interlock System for Hydrant Dispenser Vehicle

6.4.7 Warning Flag

6.4.8 Illumination at Pit Valve and Inlet Hose

6.4.9 Speed Control

6.4.10 No Smoking Policy / Mobile Phone Policy

6.4.11 Fire Extinguisher

6.4.12 Cathodic Protection

6.5 Description of Refuelling Operation Practice

6.6 General Description of the Project

6.6.1 Diversion of Submarine Pipelines

6.6.2 Construction Activities in the Vicinity of the Existing Fuel Network

6.6.3 Construction Activities in Vicinity to AFSC Tank Farm

6.6.4 New Fuel Hydrant System

6.6.5 Fuelling Operations at Apron

6.6.6 New Airside Vehicle Fuelling Station

6.7 Information Relating to Aviation Fuel (Jet A-1)

6.7.2 Physical Properties of Jet A-1

6.7.3 Hazards Associated with Jet A-1

6.8 Information Relating to Airside Vehicle Fuel

6.8.1 Physical Properties of Airside Vehicle Fuel

6.8.2 Hazards Associated with Airside Vehicle Fuel

6.9 Hazard Identification

6.9.2 Jet Fuel Spillage Incidents in Worldwide Airports

6.9.3 Jet Fuel Spillage Incidents in HKIA

6.9.4 Identification of Failure Events from Historical Incidents

6.9.5 Construction and Operation Phasing

6.9.6 HAZID Workshop

6.10 Data Collection and Analysis

6.10.1 Meteorological Data

6.10.2 Population and Traffic Data

6.10.3 Ignition Probability

6.11 Construction Phase (Aviation Fuel)

6.11.1 Frequency Assessment

6.11.2 Event Tree Analysis

6.11.3 Consequence Analysis

6.12 Operation Phase (Aviation Fuel)

6.12.1 Frequency Assessment

6.12.2 Event Tree Analysis

6.12.3 Consequence Analysis

6.12.4 Fatality Rate Estimation

6.12.5 Delayed Ignition

6.13 Operation Phase (Airside Vehicle Fuel)

6.13.1 Frequency Assessment

6.13.2 Event Tree Analysis

6.13.3 Consequence Analysis

6.13.4 Pool Fire

6.13.5 Flash Fire

6.14 Risk Results

6.14.1 Individual Risk

6.14.2 Societal Risk

6.15 Uncertainty Analysis

6.15.2 Operation Phase

6.15.3 Construction Phase

6.16 Recommendations

6.16.1 Potential Mitigation Measures

6.17 Environmental Monitoring and Audit

6.18 Conclusions

6.19 References

 

Tables

Table 6‑1: Physical Properties of Jet A-1 [1] 6-28

Table 6‑2: Other Physical Properties of Typical Jet A-1 [2] 6-29

Table 6‑3: Worldwide Historical Aviation Fuel Spillage Incident Records from 1982 to 2012_ 6-31

Table 6‑4: Summary of Identified Jet Fuel Spillage Incidents 6-36

Table 6‑5: Summary of Hazardous Scenarios for Construction and Operation Phases 6-44

Table 6‑6: Weather Probabilities (Day and Night) 6-46

Table 6‑7: Population Present at each Aircraft Parking Stand and Aviation Fuel Tank Farm_ 6-48

Table 6‑8: Probability that people are potentially present (Refuelling without passengers on board) 6-48

Table 6‑9: Probability that people are potentially present (Refuelling with passengers on board) 6-49

Table 6‑10: Population Data within 150 m Radius of the Airside Petrol Filling Station_ 6-52

Table 6‑11: Presence Probability and Indoor / Outdoor Ratio for Population near Petrol Filling Station_ 6-52

Table 6‑12: Total Ignition Probability for Jet Fuel Spillage on Land_ 6-55

Table 6‑13: Ignition Probability for Petrol [31] 6-55

Table 6‑14: Summary of Frequency/Probability of the Identified Scenarios for Construction Phase_ 6-61

Table 6‑15: Probability Data for Event Tree Analysis Submarine Pipeline (refer to Figure 6‑14) 6-62

Table 6‑16: Probability Data for Event Tree Analysis Pipeline at HKIA and Sha Chau (refer to Figure 6‑15) 6-64

Table 6‑17: Probability Data for Event Tree Analysis Underground Pipeline at the Terminal 1 (refer to Figure 6‑16) 6-65

Table 6‑18:_ Summary of Frequency Breakdown of Events for each Identified Scenario Construction Phase_ 6-66

Table 6‑19: Causes of Pipeline Failure [35] 6-70

Table 6‑20: Summary of Frequency / Probability of the Identified Scenarios for Operation Phase_ 6-71

Table 6‑21: Probability Data for Event Tree Analysis Submarine Pipeline (refer to Figure 6‑17) 6-72

Table 6‑22: Probability Data for Event Tree Analysis Underground Pipeline (refer to Figure 6‑18) 6-73

Table 6‑23: Probability Data for Event Tree Analysis Hydrant Pit Valve (refer to Figure 6‑19) 6-81

Table 6‑24: Summary of Frequency Breakdown of Events for each Identified Scenario Operation Phase_ 6-86